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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure 2.0 4.5 3.3 2.8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.9 
Public Net Current Expenditure 4.8 1.8 5.3 3.5 3.6 
Investment 18.1 27.9 61.2 15.9 11.9 
Exports 14.4 38.4 4.6 3.1 4.4 
Imports 14.9 26.0 16.4 4.7 6.8 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 8.3 25.6 5.1 5.0 4.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) 9.0 16.4 9.6 5.4 4.2 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %)      
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.6 1.4 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1.6 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 
      
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 1,914 1,964 2,020 2,072 2,118 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 243 204 172 136 121 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 11.3 9.4 7.9 6.2 5.4 
      
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€bn) -7.2 -5.0 -1.8 -1.0 0.6 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -3.7 -1.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 
General Government Debt, % of GDP 105.2 78.7 75.4 66.2 62.5 
      
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 3.2 31.6 9.2 11.5 5.2 
Current Account (% of GNP) 1.9 15.4 4.1 4.6 2.0 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2016 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 92.7 96.6 4.2 1.0 3.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.0 28.4 5.2 -0.1 5.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 53.2 87.7 64.9 2.3 61.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 326.6 335.0 2.6 -1.9 4.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.4 2.4 
   
Final Demand 501.8 550.1 9.6 -0.7 10.4 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  239.9 274.4 14.4  -1.7 16.4 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 262.0 275.6 5.2 0.2 5.0 
Net Factor Payments  -56.0 -48.8 
   
GNP at Market Prices 206.0 226.7 10.1 0.4 9.6 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.2 0.1 1.7 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 76.1 80.3 4.1 5.4 
Other 102.3 107.4 5.1 5.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4 
  
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 0.1 
  
Net Domestic Product 181.9 191.4 9.5 5.2 
Net Factor Payments -56.0 -48.8 7.2 -12.9 
National Income 125.8 142.6 16.7 13.3 
Depreciation 61.6 64.5 2.9 4.7 
GNP at Factor Cost 187.4 207.0 19.6 10.5 
Taxes less Subsidies 18.6 19.7 1.1 6.1 
GNP at Market Prices 206.0 226.7 20.8 10.1 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 86.7 60.6 -26.1 
F -51.9 -47.6 4.3 
Net Transfers -3.1 -3.8 -0.7   
Balance on Current Account 31.6 9.2 -22.5 
as % of GNP 15.4 4.1 -9.9 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2017 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 96.6 100.3 3.8 1.0 2.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.4 28.8 1.6 -1.8 3.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 87.7 104.8 19.6 3.1 15.9 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 364.5 8.8 5.5 3.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.4 2.0 
   
Final Demand 550.1 600.4 9.2 4.1 4.8 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  274.4 297.7 8.5 3.6 4.7 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 275.6 302.6 9.8 4.6 5.0 
Net Factor Payments  -48.8 -52.0    
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 250.7 10.6 4.9 5.4 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.3 0.1 2.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 80.3 84.9 4.6 5.8 
Other 107.4 124.1 16.7 15.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4   
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Net Domestic Product 191.4 212.8 21.4 11.2 
Net Factor Payments -48.8 -52.0 -3.1 6.4 
National Income 142.6 160.8 18.2 12.8 
Depreciation 64.5 69.3 4.8 7.4 
GNP at Factor Cost 207.0 230.1 23.0 11.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 19.7 20.6 0.9 4.7 
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 250.7 23.9 10.6 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 60.6 66.2 5.6 
F -47.6 -51.0 -3.3 
Net Transfers -3.8 -3.8 0.0   
Balance on Current Account 9.2 11.5 2.3 
as % of GNP 4.1 4.6 0.9 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 100.3 104.3 3.9 1.0 2.9 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.8 30.1 4.4 0.7 3.6 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 104.8 120.7 15.1 2.9 11.9 
Exports of Goods and Services 364.5 391.9 7.5 3.0 4.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 600.4 649.9 8.2 2.6 5.5 
less: 
      
Imports of Goods and Services  297.7 329.0 10.5 3.5 6.8 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 302.6 320.8 6.0 1.7 4.2 
Net Factor Payments  -52.0 -54.2    
GNP at Market Prices 250.7 266.6 6.4 2.1 4.2 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.3 3.4 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 84.9 89.5 4.7 5.5 
Other 124.1 134.6 10.5 8.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4   
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.0 -0.1  
Net Domestic Product 212.8 227.9 15.1 7.1 
Net Factor Payments -52.0 -54.2 -2.2 4.3 
National Income 160.8 173.7 12.9 8.0 
Depreciation 69.3 71.6 2.3 3.5 
GNP at Factor Cost 230.1 245.3 15.2 6.6 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.6 21.3 0.7 3.3 
GNP at Market Prices 250.7 266.6 15.9 6.4 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 66.2 62.2 -4.0 
F -51.0 -53.2 -2.2 
Net Transfers -3.8 -3.8 0.0   
Balance on Current Account 11.5 5.2 -6.2 
as % of GNP 4.6 2.0 -2.3 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
The Irish economy looks set to experience another year of strong recovery in 
2017. The performance of key indicators – taxation revenues and labour market 
variables – underpins our assessment that the domestic economy will experience 
output growth of approximately 5 per cent for the current year. We expect the 
economy to also grow strongly in 2018, at a rate of 4.2 per cent.  
To put this performance in context, the European Union, which is deemed to be 
currently experiencing a growth recovery, is expected to grow by less than 1.9 per 
cent for the same period. However, it is worth pointing out that much of the Irish 
growth is due to domestic factors, with investment and consumption contributing 
strongly. Both Irish exports and imports look set to register significantly more 
modest levels of activity in 2017. While this may be down to certain well 
acknowledged difficulties associated with the National Accounts, it is worth 
noting that a sustainable growth path for a small open economy such as Ireland’s 
requires both domestic and external sources of growth over the longer term. 
One growing risk for the domestic outlook is the performance of the UK 
economy. The recent revision downwards of the UK forecast by the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) illustrates the precarious nature of the UK economy 
especially given the uncertainty of the Brexit outcome. While Ireland’s trade 
has diversified in recent times, the performance of our closest neighbour 
is still important in generating external sources of growth for the domestic 
economy. 
The overall size of the recent budgetary package, which was framed against a 
relatively modest amount of fiscal space, was a prudent outcome. In a Special 
Article to the Commentary, Callan et al. (2017) indicate that overall, the impact 
of the budget policy was to reduce incomes somewhat below the levels 
which would have obtained if tax and welfare parameters had been indexed in 
line with forecast wage inflation. 
While the Irish banking sector continues to recover from the post-2008 
financial sector downturn, the Commentary highlights a number of key 
areas where difficulties remain with financing conditions. In particular, 
differences are still apparent between comparable European and domestic 
mortgage and consumer interest rates. This may be a contributing factor to the 
declining investment rates observed in certain key indigenous sectors of the 
domestic economy. Low 
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investment rates could also be driven by the ongoing uncertainties related to 
Brexit. 
The pace of growth in 2017 and the expected performance of the economy in 
2018 mean that crucial policy challenges are likely to arise in the coming years if 
the present strong recovery is set to mature into sustainable performance over 
the medium term. In that regard two other Special Articles to the Commentary 
raise general issues of sustainability. McQuinn (2017), in examining the 
residential property market, argues that, given the strong expected increases in 
house prices in the economy, the relevant authorities should desist from 
implementing policies which further stimulate housing demand. This applies both 
in the context of fiscal policy increasing affordability levels in the economy and 
macroprudential policy potentially enabling increased rates of credit provision. In 
another article, Redmond and Whelan (2017) examine the Irish labour market 
from a micro-level perspective. They identify the potential to better use the skills 
of existing employees as the economy continues to improve and the labour 
market tightens. However, Redmond and Whelan (2017) also show that it is 
unlikely that there are enough people amongst those currently unemployed to 
meet future Irish labour demand. Therefore, if capacity constraints are not to 
become binding in the Irish market, immigration will be increasingly important. 
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The International Economy 
Though still subdued compared to pre-crisis levels, world real GDP growth 
forecasts remain positive through the latter half of the year. This growth is well 
distributed, with the OECD reporting balanced trends between advanced and 
developing economies.1 According to consensus forecasts, estimates of growth 
for 2017 indicate that real GDP will reach an annual rate of 3.6 per cent, 
reflecting the fastest pace of global growth in two years and a rate just below the 
average global growth rate of 3.8 between 1985 and 2007, as estimated by the 
IMF. 
Amongst developed economies, it appears that the recovery is becoming more 
ingrained in the Eurozone with declining unemployment rates and improving 
domestic demand all contributing to an improved outlook. In unison with these 
promising developments, the ECB has recently announced plans to taper the 
quantitative easing programme, cutting monthly levels of asset purchases in half 
to €30 billion, starting next year. Given the ECB’s pledge to keep borrowing costs 
unchanged until well after the end of these asset purchases, it is likely the policy 
rate will remain at its current rate until early 2019. McQuinn and Whelan (2017), 
in an updated analysis of earlier work, highlight the cyclical nature of the EU 
recovery. They contend that underlying vulnerabilities persist across Europe and, 
accordingly, project productivity growth in the Euro Area of below 1 per cent per 
year over the next decade and weaker in later decades. The results of McQuinn 
and Whelan (2017) are summarised in the following box. 
BOX 1 EUROPE’S LONG-TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS: AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT 
The recent adjustment to the asset purchase programme by the ECB reflects the general 
growing confidence that the European economy has been steadily improving over the 
last number of years. Growth rates for both the EU and Euro Area, which had been 
negative as recently as 2012 and 2013 respectively, have over the past three years 
averaged 1.7 per cent per annum. However in a number of updates of their previous 
analysis, McQuinn and Whelan (2016; 2017) find little evidence to support the view that 
Europe is on a new growth trajectory. Rather, they find that the recent recovery is more 
of a cyclical development reflecting a decline in the relatively high unemployment rates, 
which had persisted since the international financial downturn, while long-term 
downward trends in productivity have not reversed. 
In their initial study, McQuinn and Whelan (2008) focused on trends in European growth 
1 OECD, Interim Economic Outlook release of 20th September 2017: www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-outlook. 
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rates up to mid-2006. While the period of growth in Europe prior to the global crisis of 
2008 is sometimes referred to as ‘the boom’, McQuinn and Whelan (2008) noted that 
long-run trends in both productivity and per capita hours worked were deteriorating to 
the point where potential output growth in the Euro Area was at a historical low point 
and, apparently, on a negative trend. In particular, after a long period of catching up with 
US levels of labour productivity, Euro Area productivity growth had, from the mid-1990s 
onwards, fallen significantly behind. 
McQuinn and Whelan (2016, 2017) update their calculations from their 2008 paper and 
provide projections for growth in the Euro Area out to 2060 based on a recovery scenario 
over the rest of this decade and long-term demographic trends. They also describe the 
potential impact of structural reforms relative to this baseline scenario. In this box, we 
summarise the main elements of their updated analysis. 
With a long-term projection of TFP growth of 0.2 per cent, a gradual decline in the work-
age population and a static average workweek, McQuinn and Whelan (2017) project a 
‘baseline’ average real GDP growth rate in the Euro Area of 0.6 per cent over the next 
decade even if the unemployment rate and investment share of GDP return to their pre-
crisis levels by 2020. 
The findings are sobering for those expecting economic growth to deal with the Euro 
Area’s debt problems in the coming decades. Among the results McQuinn and Whelan 
(2016; 2017) report are the following: 
• Total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the twelve-country Euro Area group has 
declined in each decade since the 1970s. Over the years 2000-2016, a period that 
includes multiple slow-downs and expansions, TFP growth has averaged only 0.2 per 
cent per year. 
• The slump in investment due to weak growth is now having significant negative 
supply-side effects. We estimate that capital stock growth, which averaged 1.9 per 
cent per year over the past two decades, is now falling below 1 per cent per year. 
Using an elasticity of output with respect to capital of one-third, this factor alone is 
currently reducing the supply-side growth potential of the Euro Area economy by 
about 0.5 percentage points per year. 
• While Europe’s demographic ageing pattern is sometimes presented as a longer-
term issue that will cause problems relating to pension systems in future decades, 
the ageing process is actually affecting Europe’s growth potential right now. The 
work-age population of the Euro Area has peaked and Eurostat projections 
anticipate that the decline in this age group will accelerate in the coming decades. 
Even assuming a return to pre-crisis average unemployment rates and ruling out 
future declines in the average workweek of employees, McQuinn and Whelan 
(2016; 2017) project that, if current patterns of labour market participation persist, 
total hours worked will decline significantly from the start of the next decade. 
With a long-term projection of TFP growth of 0.2 per cent, a gradual decline in the work-
age population and a static average workweek, McQuinn and Whelan (2017) project a  
 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 7  |  5  
 
‘baseline’ average real GDP growth rate in the Euro Area of 0.6 per cent over the next 
decade even if the unemployment rate and investment share of GDP return to their pre-
crisis levels by 2020. 
Output is measured using the following Cobb-Douglas production function 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is real GDP, 𝐾𝑡 is capital input, 𝐿𝑡is labour input (defined in this paper as total 
hours worked), and 𝐴𝑡 is total factor productivity. Output growth can then be written as 
𝑌?̇?
𝑌𝑡
=  𝐴?̇?
𝐴𝑡
+  𝛼 𝐾?̇?
𝐾𝑡
+ (1 −  𝛼) 𝐿?̇?
𝐿𝑡
 (2) 
Table A presents results for the Euro Area and the US of the growth accounting exercise 
which allocates output growth according to the three components in Equation (2). With 
data on output, capital, and labour growth to hand and a value for α, this equation can 
be used to calculate TFP growth. 
TABLE A  DECOMPOSITION OF EURO AREA AND US OUTPUT GROWTH RATES (%) 
 
 Euro Area United States 
Period Y A K L Y A K L 
1970-1976 3.6 2.7 1.5 -0.6 3.1 0.9 1.2 1 
1977-1986 2.1 1.6 0.8 -0.4 3.1 0.7 1.2 1.2 
1987-1996 2.3 1.5 0.8 0 2.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 
2007-2016 0.3 0.1 0.5 -0.2 1.3 0.4 0.7 0.2 
                  
2000-2016 1 0.2 0.6 0.2 1.8 0.5 1 0.3 
2010-2016 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 2 0.4 0.6 1 
2014-2016 1.9 0.6 0.3 1 2.1 0.3 0.7 1.1 
2014-2016 (excl Irl) 1.6 0.3 0.3 1 2.1 0.3 0.7 1.1 
 
Sources:  McQuinn and Whelan (2017). 
 
• While there have been regular cyclical fluctuations, GDP growth in the Euro Area 
appears to have been on a downward trend since the 1970s. During the 1970s, GDP 
growth averaged 3.7 per cent per year. During the 1980s this fell to 2.2 per cent. In 
the 1990s, the average growth rate was 2.1 per cent and the period from 2000 
onwards has seen an average growth rate of only 1.0 per cent. 
• The growth rate of total hours worked in the Euro Area has shown no clear trend 
over the period since 1970. Over the period 2000-2016, the growth rate of total 
hours worked in the Euro Area has been effectively flat. 
• McQuinn and Whelan (2016; 2017) estimate capital stock growth in the Euro Area 
was over 4 per cent per year in the early 1970s but then fluctuated between 2 and 3  
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per cent between the late 1970s and 2008.2 Recent years, however, have seen a 
significant decline in the investment share of GDP and they estimate that the Euro 
Area capital stock is now growing at an annual rate below 1 per cent. 
• The rate of TFP growth has also declined gradually over time. Table A provides 
estimates for each of the ten-year intervals preceding 2007. TFP growth was running 
at 2.7 per cent in the first half of the 1970s, fell to 1.6 per cent over 1977-1986, to 
1.5 per cent over 1987-1996 and to 0.7 per cent over 1997-2006. The period from 
2007-2016 has seen TFP increase only at an average rate of 0.1 per cent per year. 
• The recent return to growth in the Euro Area does not signal an improved TFP 
performance. While the average rate of TFP growth over the 2014 to 2016 period 
increased to 0.6 per cent, half of this increase is accounted for by the huge increase 
in Irish GDP in 2015, which reflects issues related to multinational corporation 
activity that had effectively nothing to do with the real economy of the Euro Area. 
Excluding Ireland, TFP growth accounted for only 0.3 per cent of the 1.6 per cent 
average growth rate of this period. The largest contributor to growth, accounting for 
1.0 per cent, was increased labour input, mainly reflecting the decline in the 
unemployment rate. 
References: 
McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2017). ‘Europe’s long-term growth prospects: With and 
without structural reforms’, chapter in Structural Reforms and European Integration, 
editors P. de Grauwe, N. Campos and Y. Ji. 
 
McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2016). ‘The Prospects for Future Economic Growth in the 
Euro Area, Intereconomics’, Review of European Economic Policy, Volume 51, 
November/December, Number 6, pp.305-311. 
 
McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2008). ‘Prospects for growth in the Euro Area’, CESifo 
Economic Studies, Vol. 54(4), pp.642-680. 
 
This box was prepared by Kieran McQuinn and Karl Whelan (UCD). 
 
Key US economic indicators such as employment growth, consumer sentiment 
and trade expansion all point to robust economic growth in 2017. Elsewhere, the 
decision by the Bank of Japan to keep monetary policy steady during a period 
where its peers in North America and Europe have begun winding down stimulus 
measures suggests the economy there continues to underperform. As long as 
Japan’s recovery remains moderate, monetary policy will likely remain stable 
until the country’s 2019/2020 goal of 2 per cent inflation is met. The recent fiscal 
stimulus by the Japanese authorities will contribute to modest growth in 2017, 
but a labour market approaching capacity threatens to slow down the recovery. 
 
 
                                                          
 
2  The observations from 1980 onwards are perhaps more reliable given the initial stock for 1970 is an estimate. 
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Despite ongoing concerns as to the sustainability of its underlying economic 
performance, the Chinese economy registered strong year-on-year growth of 6.8 
per cent for the third quarter of 2017. Current trends would suggest it is likely the 
economy will meet the government’s GDP target of 6.5 per cent growth for the 
year. Recent attempts by the Chinese authorities to tackle pollution do indicate a 
certain intention to address structural issues in the Chinese economy though 
there are still key concerns regarding the sustainability of state-owned 
enterprises and the extent of credit provision in the economy. More generally, 
other developing countries have continued benefiting from improved global 
demand and greater stability in financial markets. Key risks to developing 
economies include the persistent volatility in commodity prices as well as the 
possibility of capital flight risk stemming from the increasingly healthy 
macroeconomic conditions central banks are observing in developed nations. 
Commodity price volatility introduces elements of underinvestment and currency 
swings in the developing world which result in weaker growth rates and a slower 
more fractured integration into global markets.3 As core economies continue to 
increase their policy rates and taper off from quantitative easing however, there 
is a significant possibility this could result in a significant reduction in capital flows 
towards emerging economies (Agosin and Huaita, 2011; Forbes and Warnock, 
2012).4 
 
Figure 1 shows the forecasts for GDP growth by some of the major institutions in 
the respective economies. The outlook overall continues to remain positive over 
the next two years, with the majority of experts adding upward revisions to 
forecasts for the Euro Area. The wide bands around the UK forecast for 2017 and 
2018 have extended slightly however, indicating increased uncertainty regarding 
the future prospects of the UK economy.  
 
 
                                                          
 
3  Jacks, D., K. O’Rourke and J. Williamson (2011). ‘Commodity Price Volatility and World Market Integration since 
1700’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, August 2011, Vol. 93(3), pp. 800-813. 
4  Agosin, M. and F. Huaita (2011). ‘Capital flows to emerging economies: Minsky in the tropics’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 663-683. 
 Forbes, K. and F. Warnock (2012). ‘Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment’, Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 88, pp. 235-251. 
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FIGURE 1 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
        Euro Area             United States             United Kingdom 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
Given the ongoing uncertainty facing the future prospects of the United 
Kingdom’s economy, we focus on the UK economy in the International section. 
 
THE UK ECONOMY – APPROACHING BREXIT 
The recent revised estimates of growth for the UK released by the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR)5 clearly demonstrate that the UK economy is slowing 
down. Figure 2 summarises the OBR growth outlook for both GDP and 
productivity per hour and compares the forecast with the previous estimate. 
Arguably the most important forecast is the expected continued stagnation of UK 
productivity rates. Previously, the OBR had assumed that productivity rates would 
return to pre financial crisis rates. However, in this forecast, that assumption is no 
longer made. 
 
 
                                                          
 
5  Forecasts were released as part of the UK Budget. See http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/efo/economic-fiscal-
outlook-november-2017 for more details.  
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FIGURE 2 LATEST OBR FORECASTS OF UK GDP AND PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-
YEAR) COMPARED WITH PREVIOUS FORECAST 
 
Source:  Office for Budget Responsibility. 
 
While many argue this is a symptom of the uncertainty surrounding the recent 
Brexit referendum, it must be kept in mind that this slowdown had emerged in 
the UK economy since early 2015. Comparing the recent performance of the UK 
economy to comparator countries yields insights into developments since the 
Brexit referendum. The UK is now experiencing one of the weakest growth rates 
amongst its G7 counterparts with a quarter-on-quarter growth rate of 0.4 per 
cent for Q3 2017. In comparison, the EU28 average growth is 0.6 per cent. Recent 
year-on-year quarterly results show the UK as one of the poorest performers in 
the advanced world during what can otherwise be regarded as a global upswing 
in growth.  
 
Figure 3 below demonstrates this trend, wherein the net difference between UK, 
European and US growth rates has only become negative quite recently.  
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FIGURE 3 UK QUARTERLY GROWTH DIFFERENCES (PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
  
 
Source:  OECD.stat, Quarterly National Accounts. 
 
Within the UK economy there is conflicting evidence across sectors as to the 
current performance. For example, on a quarterly basis, the construction sector 
contracted by 0.9 per cent for Q3 2017 whereas a strong counteracting force is 
the continued growth in the services sector of 0.4 per cent. This reinforces the 
continued growth in the services sector within the UK economy. With a weight of 
79.3 per cent in Q3 2017, the services industry accounts for the largest share of 
gross domestic product. In the uncertain post Brexit climate, this trend may prove 
to be a key vulnerability, given the relatively mobile nature of services compared 
to the manufacturing or construction sectors. This is particularly true for financial 
services which accounts for 41.5 per cent of total services in the UK as of August 
2017.6 
 
Given the heightened uncertainty due to Brexit, it is informative to assess trends 
in the international investment position of the UK economy. In particular, major 
changes in the investment position have resulted in a substantial re-allocation of 
investment of UK equity to the rest of the world. Most notably, in 2016 there was 
a £489.8 billion downward revision in the net investment position, which 
represents 20 per cent of the UK economy.  
 
                                                          
 
6  Office of National Statistics, UK index of services: August 2017. 
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FIGURE 4 REVISIONS TO UK NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION, 2006 TO 2016 (£ BILLION) 
  
 
Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS) and www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/articles/ 
 nationalaccountsarticles/impactofmethodchangestothenationalaccountsandsectoraccountsquarter11997toquarter22017. 
Note: Impact of method changes to the National Accounts and sector accounts: Quarter 1, 1997 to Quarter 2, 2017. 
 
This indicates a significant increased diversification away from UK corporate 
bonds and towards overseas holdings. Referring to Figure 5, in 2016 a historically 
large net disinvestment of £53 billion was recorded. To keep this in perspective, 
the investment gains made in 2014 and 2015 combined only account for 75 per 
cent of this value. Significant levels of investment have been pouring into 
overseas government securities, the largest flows seen since the dataset began in 
1986. This has occurred in tandem with seven consecutive quarters of 
disinvestment away from UK corporate securities. This suggests significant 
concerns amongst investors vis-à-vis the future performance of the UK economy. 
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FIGURE 5 NET INVESTMENT BY UK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (£ BILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS). 
 
In summary, the performance of the UK economy is expected to weaken in 2017 
as high inflation and uncertainty due to Brexit negotiations are set to adversely 
impact consumers’ expenditure. In November, in a move not seen in a decade, 
the Bank of England (BoE) increased the policy rate to 0.5 per cent in an attempt 
to curb high inflation. However, the move may compound the UK’s weak growth 
outlook. Wren-Lewis,7 for example, suggests these increases will contribute 
towards expectations of low growth in the future as certain firms will continue to 
underinvest compared to firms elsewhere. This will restrict increases in 
investment in the UK economy and place further downward pressure on UK 
productivity rates.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
In Figure 6 the year-on-year growth rate of quarterly total Irish exports and 
imports is displayed. A key characteristic of Ireland’s export performance in 2016 
was the difference between services and goods exports. Services exports 
increased by over 10 per cent in 2016 and show signs of even greater growth in 
2017 with increases averaging 14.9 per cent through Q2 2017. Goods and services 
import growth rates have been steadily decreasing however, with services 
contracting by 3.5 per cent and goods imports falling by 4.5 per cent. The 
significant reduction in goods exports in 2016, compared with 2015, was mainly 
attributable to the reduced levels of contract manufacturing. FitzGerald (2015) 
 
                                                          
 
7  https://mainlymacro.blogspot.ie/2017/11/the-brexit-interest-rate-increases-and.html. 
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attributes contract manufacturing amongst other factors as one of the key 
problems in terms of interpreting the Irish National Accounts.8 
 
FIGURE 6 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Given the difficulties in understanding recent movements in the Irish terms of 
trade, in the next box we summarise some of the conceptual issues related to 
national accounting treatment of trade flows.  
 
BOX 2 OWNERSHIP-BASED ADJUSTMENTS TO CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN IRELAND 
 
Conventionally trade is seen as the exchange of goods and services across the borders of 
different nations. More recently however, the production of goods can depend upon a 
globalised network of supply chains with key components sourced from a variety of 
different countries. Much of the production process for specific goods owned by Irish 
firms can take place outside of the country and in some cases foreign activities can 
encompass the entirety of the goods’ production cycle. Even though Irish-resident firms 
maintain ownership of the goods, they may lease out the production process to an entity 
in a different country. The sale of such goods between two entities in foreign countries is 
still considered an export of goods if ownership is retained by the Irish firm, even if the 
entire production process took place outside the Irish jurisdiction. This, along with other  
 
 
                                                          
 
8  FitzGerald, J. (2015). ‘Problems Interpreting National Accounts in a Globalised Economy – Ireland’, ESRI: Special 
Article. 
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types of ownership trade, can cause differences in total trade balances compared with 
what international trade would imply. Below are the key components of trade on an 
ownership basis which contribute to the differences between international and total 
trade values. 
Contract Manufacturing: This process involves contracting a foreign manufacturer who 
will handle the processing of intermediate goods which are intended to be sold 
thereafter. These production arrangements include (a) goods sent abroad for further 
processing, (b) goods received from abroad for processing in Ireland and (c) goods 
purchased and processed abroad. Often referred to as ‘factoryless production’, contract 
manufacturing maintains ownership of the processed goods by Irish-resident firms (or 
companies abroad when Irish resident companies are contracted for processing goods), 
with the sale of the final product being recorded as an Irish export (or Irish import) when 
the change of ownership occurs at the end of the production cycle.  
Merchanting of Goods: This aspect of ownership-based adjustments to trade 
incorporates the total value of goods resold internationally without ever interacting with 
the Irish border. Values are calculated on a net basis wherein the purchase and resale 
values are taken into account and a net exports value is combined together.  
Other Conceptual Adjustments: These are other adjustment processes used to adjust 
Balance of Payment values and include estimates for the purchases of aviation fuel, 
illegal cross-border trade, as well as various adjustments to merchandise values and 
repair contracts.  
The ‘c.i.f. to f.o.b.’ adjustment: Importing goods will require transportation and 
insurance costs. These costs linked to getting goods across the border are factored out, 
resulting in the free on-board value. For further detail on these items, see CSO (2016).  
Reference:  
Central Statistics Office, Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016. 
 
The drop in Irish net exports between 2015 and 2016 saw net levels of contract 
manufacturing alone fall by €9.1 billion, whereas total international net exports 
only rose by €3.2 billion. Though contract manufacturing does not involve any 
cross-border activity, it plays an enormous role in determining Irish trade values. 
Historically, contract manufacturing has represented close to 1 per cent of total 
net exports of goods. This value climbed to 20 per cent in 2014 before increasing 
further to over 50 per cent of the total value of goods exports in 2015 and 2016. 
Of the other adjustment components listed in the box above, these account for 
about 5 per cent of the total value of goods exports. Figure 7 below distinguishes 
quarterly totals of Irish exports and imports between the different types of trade 
discussed. While total goods exports are trending downwards across recent 
quarters, it can be seen that international goods exports are in fact increasing.  
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FIGURE 7 GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY TYPE (€MILLION) 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Focusing on the components of international trade, exports of food and live 
animals increased by 13 per cent year-on-year for the period January to 
September. Medical and pharmaceutical product exports rose by 18 per cent in 
the same period, netting an increase of €4.6 billion. Organic chemicals, however, 
saw the largest drop in levels by €3.5 billion (-25 per cent). Medical and 
pharmaceutical product imports grew 36 per cent, increasing by €2.5 billion on a 
year-to-year basis in 2017. Road vehicle and other transport equipment imports 
saw the largest combined decrease of €2.9 billion (10 and 28 per cent 
respectively) between the same periods.  
 
In terms of net trade, these levels too differ as a result of adjustments previously 
discussed. The differences, however, are far more dramatic. Figure 8 displays net 
surpluses for both categories. It is clear Ireland’s cross-border trade balance has 
been falling steadily since 2014. As of 2016, cross-border net exports are worth 
€583 million whereas adjusted net exports are valued at €61,138 million.  
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FIGURE 8 CROSS-BORDER AND ADJUSTED NET EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (€MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The CSO has recently produced cross-border trade values specifically between 
the UK and Ireland.9 Between merchandise and services, Irish-UK cross-border 
trade netted surpluses to the Irish economy of €8,896 million and €9,567 million 
for 2015 and 2016 respectively. This underscores the vulnerability of the 
domestic economy to a hard Brexit type outcome.  
 
Another point of interest in terms of the vulnerability of the domestic economy 
to a hard Brexit is how the trade of domestically-owned Irish firms is diversified. 
Between domestic and foreign-owned Irish firms, the split is exactly 50:50 in 
terms of total trade to the UK. As Lawless et al. (2017)10 highlight, between 2011 
and 2015, 41.5 per cent of Irish non-food exports and 49 per cent of Irish food 
exports were destined for the UK. Given that 14 per cent of total exports are 
destined for the UK, this suggests foreign-owned firms operating in Ireland are 
more richly diversified in terms of export destinations, leaving domestically-
owned firms particularly exposed to UK specific risk. The study also identifies Irish 
domestically-owned firms as being far less likely to survive as exporters in 
general. Focusing on the cross-border trade of goods, Lawless and Studnicka 
(2017)11 show that a WTO arrangement would result in UK cross-border trade 
flows shrinking by 9 to 17 per cent in value, with the food sector likely to be most 
affected. 
 
                                                          
 
9  Central Statistics Office, Balance of International Payments Quarter 2, 2017. 
10  Lawless, M., I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnicka (2017). ‘Expanding and diversifying the manufactured exports of Irish-
owned enterprises’, Evidence for Policy, ESRI, Department of Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation and Enterprise Ireland. 
11  Lawless, M. and Z. Studnika (2017). ‘Potential impacts of WTO tariffs on cross-border trade’, InterTradeIreland, 
available online at: www.intertradeireland.com. 
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FIGURE 9 ANNUAL UK SHARE OF TOTAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Whilst shares of total trade are falling with respect to the UK, changes in these 
exports and imports for the period January to September remain relatively stable 
as shown in Table 1 compared to the same period in 2016. Exports and imports of 
Chemicals and related products saw the largest changes, of 36 and 30 per cent 
respectively. Machinery saw a slight fall of 6 per cent in exports to the UK. There 
was also a significant increase in trade with the US, while there was relatively 
little growth overall in trade with the rest of the EU for the same period.  
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TABLE 1 JANUARY-SEPTEMBER ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR THE UK, 
THE US AND THE REST OF EU FOR MAJOR COMMODITIES 
 Exports Imports 
Total – UK 11 8 
Food and live animals 8 5 
Chemicals and related products 36 30 
Machinery and transport equipment -6 0 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3 -2 
   
Total – Rest of EU 1 -2 
Food and live animals 19 9 
Chemicals and related products 0 14 
Machinery and transport equipment -2 -12 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles -11 -2 
   
Total – US 4 6 
Food and live animals 36 -11 
Chemicals and related products 10 85 
Machinery and transport equipment -29 -24 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 15 -3 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Based on the latest trends and the reduced expectations of strong growth in the 
US and UK, we have revised export growth expectations down to 3.1 per cent in 
2017, followed by 4.4 per cent in 2018 (Figure 10). We also revise downwards our 
import forecasts; however, given the expected increase in private consumption, 
we still expect imports to grow by 4.7 per cent this year and 6.8 per cent in 2018. 
Overall, the net contribution to GDP from trade is expected to be moderately 
negative both in 2017 and 2018. Given the highly influential role that 
developments in contract manufacturing and aircraft leasing can have on the 
terms of trade, these forecasts do come with an elevated level of uncertainty. 
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FIGURE 10 IMPORT AND EXPORT GROWTH (2017 - 2018 FORECASTS) 
 
 
Source: QEC calculations. 
 
As of Q2 2017, the current account balance was a €872 million deficit, half the 
value for the same period last year. This improvement is attributed to a year-on-
year increase in the net exports of services. The outflow of primary income, 
however, is now at a particularly high level after a sudden rise in the outflow of 
portfolio income on equity by 30 per cent over a single quarter. This is likely due 
to improving financial conditions for investment funds resulting in greater profit 
repatriation from Ireland. Figure 11 depicts the current account by its various 
categories of income flows.  
 
FIGURE 11 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, QUARTERLY (€MILLION): 2011 - 2017 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The Domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
The latter part of the year has seen strong growth in taxation revenues across 
nearly all items. This, allied to the continuing robust performance of the Irish 
labour market where the unemployment rate is now expected to be less than 6 
per cent by the end of the year, results in our overall estimate of output growth 
of 5 per cent in 2017. 
 
While this is broadly unchanged since the last Commentary, the expected 
composition of growth has altered somewhat. As explained in the International 
section we have revised downwards our outlook for both exports and imports 
somewhat. However, the overall impact on domestic growth via the terms of 
trade is relatively unchanged. Domestic factors, consumption and investment, are 
expected to be the main sources of growth in both 2017 and 2018. For 2018, we 
are forecasting a marginally stronger increase in output of 4.2 per cent than 
envisaged in the previous Commentary. 
 
In Figure 12 we compare the actual Irish output performance for 2016, along with 
the Commentary forecasts for 2017 and 2018 with other European economies. 
Irish output growth is currently over 2.5 times that of both the Euro Area and the 
European Union and is expected to continue to outperform most other European 
countries over the next 18 months. 
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FIGURE 12 ACTUAL (2016) AND FORECAST (2017, 2018) GDP GROWTH RATES FOR SELECT EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIES 
 
 
Sources:  QEC calculations for Ireland, AMECO estimates for all other countries. 
 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
In line with the broader trends in the Eurozone, macro-financial conditions in 
Ireland have continued to improve in the most recent quarters. The extensive 
monetary policy stimulus undertaken by the ECB, in particular through the non-
standard asset purchase programmes, have compressed sovereign, financial 
institution and large corporate borrowing costs. Negative yields on overnight 
interest rates (Figure 13) have provided a stabilising factor for market stresses 
and, despite the rise in geopolitical uncertainties surrounding the policies of the 
US administration, Eurozone elections, and the ongoing Brexit discussions, 
financial markets appear to be experiencing a relative calm (ECB, 2017).12  
 
 
                                                          
 
12  European Central Bank (2017), ‘Financial Stability Review’, (1), May 2017, Frankfurt.    
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FIGURE 13 EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE (%) 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
However, while the European economy has begun to show signs of a cyclical 
recovery thus providing a boost to the macro-financial backdrop, the degree to 
which accommodative monetary policy is reducing market tensions may lead to 
risks arising if the ECB pull back towards a more normalised monetary policy 
stance. At their most recent governing council, the ECB held benchmark rates at 
historic low levels but reduced the scope of asset purchases. The implications of 
these developments for Ireland are discussed in detail in Box 3.  
 
One of the implications of the expansionary monetary policy has been a 
compression of sovereign bond yields. The Public Sector Asset Purchase 
Programme has been purchasing government securities on the secondary market 
since March 2015, putting downward pressure on yields. Ireland has been a 
major beneficiary with a net cumulative €23 billion worth of bonds purchased to 
date (net of redemptions). Coupling the monetary policy stance with the 
economic recovery and the successful completion of the official financing support 
programme, the cost of debt for the Irish sovereign has declined to historic lows, 
and remains only a number of percentage points above the benchmark German 
rate (Figure 14).  
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FIGURE 14 TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD (%) 
 
Source:  St. Louis Fed database. 
 
Trends in lending  
While the overall financing environment has become more benign in recent 
months, what matters for Irish economic growth is how these developments 
translate in new flows of lending and the cost of borrowing for Irish households 
and firms. Figure 15 presents the growth rates of credit to households from Irish 
resident credit institutions. The data are split by loans for house purchase and 
other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). Overall, the 
change in credit for house purchase continues to decline, down -0.6 per cent 
year-on-year to Q2 2017. However, a distinguishing feature of 2016 and the first 
quarter of 2017 has been a reduction in the pace of deleveraging or credit 
contraction; the rate of decline has moderated from -2.2 per cent in Q2 2017, 
pointing towards a further stabilisation of the sector.  
 
In Q2 2017, we observe an increase in the growth rate of lending for non-housing 
related household loans, which are now up 6.2 per cent on a year-on-year basis. 
As these loans are mainly for consumption purposes and auto financing, the 
broader recovery in household spending is undoubtedly leading to an increase in 
demand for this type of financing.  
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FIGURE 15 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
Turning to the provision of credit to non-financial corporations, the overall stock 
of credit is continuing to decline, down by -11 per cent in Q2 2017 year-on-year. 
As noted in the previous Commentary, this represents an acceleration in the pace 
of deleveraging which runs counter to the findings for households. However, 
there is an important compositional factor to consider with this series. Credit to 
firms outside the financial and property related sectors, which can be thought of 
as finance for the real economy, in fact grew by 1.9 per cent in Q2 2017 which 
represents an acceleration relative to 0.6 per cent growth in Q1 2017. In terms of 
financing growth for Irish businesses following the crisis, it is noteworthy to see 
credit flows beginning to pick up. The overall fall in private sector enterprise 
credit continues to be driven by deleveraging amongst financial sector and 
property related firms. 
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FIGURE 16 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES (%) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes: Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.14, growth rates series codes 17, 17.1 and 17.2.  
 
While monitoring the stock of lending is important from the perspective of risk, 
understanding new lending flows is critical for growth as these funds directly 
cover new investments and spending. In terms of new mortgage lending, the 
significant increase in house prices in the past number of months has begun to 
coincide with greater rates of mortgage lending. In Q3 2017, the volume of new 
mortgage drawdowns increased by 16 per cent year-on-year and the value of 
mortgages increased by 29 per cent year-on-year. The relatively higher growth 
rate in the value relative to the volume of loans represents the fact that 
borrowers are drawing down larger and larger loans given rising house prices. The 
average loan size for mortgages was €221,748 in Q3 2017 which is 87 per cent of 
the peak value in Q1 2008. Indeed, the value of new drawdowns exceeded  
€2 billion for the third quarter of 2017, for the first time since 2009, which is an 
indication of heightened credit market activity. McQuinn (2017) finds that Irish 
house price growth in the recovery has occurred without a significant increase in 
credit expansion. With the credit market beginning to grow rapidly, strict 
monitoring of these developments is required to ensure a house price-credit 
spiral does not materialise.  
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FIGURE 17 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF NEW MORTGAGE DRAWDOWNS (%) 
 
 
Sources:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
The increase in mortgage lending, and greater loan sizes, must be assessed in 
terms of the potential financial stability risk. Given the low base from which 
mortgage credit is growing, and the current credit conditions under which lending 
is taking place, we continue to hold the view of the previous Commentary that 
the credit risk of new lending is low and as such does not at present pose a threat 
to banking sector stability.  
 
The most recent mortgage market overview provided by Kinghan et al. (2017)13 
covers lending for the first six months of this year, the first period in which banks 
have been operating under the changes to the macroprudential regulations 
announced in November 2016. It is also a period in which the Government Help-
to-Buy scheme was fully operational. A number of insights from this research are 
important to highlight. First, the banks appear to be fully exploiting the 
allowances to exceed the mortgage caps – 18 per cent of the value of loans were 
allowed to breach the LTI limit (max 20 per cent) and 20 per cent of second time 
borrowers were allowed an LTV over 80 per cent which is also at the regulatory 
maximum. While the average LTI and LTV ratios for FTBs and SSBs remain well 
below the macroprudential restrictions, there does appear to be some drift 
towards higher leverage across all borrowers. For example Figure 3 of Kinghan et 
al. (2017), shows that nearly 40 per cent of first time buyers are drawing down 
loans at 90 per cent LTV which is an increase on the previous year. An excessive 
 
                                                          
 
13  Kinghan, C., P. Lyons and Y. McCarthy (2017). ‘Macroprudential Measures and Irish Mortgage Lending: Insights from 
H1 2017’, Central Bank of Ireland, Economic Letter No. 13. 
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concentration of high LTV loans can leave borrowers exposed to the risk of 
moving into negative equity following any reduction in property prices. However, 
the recent Household Credit Market Report shows very few loans are being 
extended with a repayment burden above 25 per cent of gross monthly income. 
This evidence would appear to indicate conservative credit risk assessment.  
 
On the current evidence, credit risks would appear to be moderate given the 
credit conditions of new lending. While the drift towards a higher share of FTBs at 
90 per cent LTV is noteworthy, the income restriction at 3.5 times gross income is 
lower than international peers thus providing good protection against borrowers 
over-extending themselves in an affordability context. Therefore, there would 
appear to be little evidence to suggest a policy tightening is required over and 
above the changes just announced by the Central Bank.  
 
Another aspect of new lending that provides a guide to the health of the 
domestic economy is lending to small business. More recently, loans to Irish 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have grown steadily in 2016 (Figure 
18). This continues the trend in overall SME lending which began to increase in 
2015 from mid-2014 lows. Gross new lending was €1,230 billion in Q2 2017, up 
from €1,173 million one year earlier. Of note is the sectoral allocation of new 
financing which has begun to re-orientate towards the construction and 
domestically non-traded sectors more recently. Increased credit extension to 
these sectors is consistent with the broadening of the recovery in the domestic 
economy. 
 
FIGURE 18 QUARTERLY NEW LENDING TO IRISH SMES BY SECTOR (FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
 
Sources:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
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Interest rates and the cost of finance 
The cost of finance in Ireland for both corporate and household credit has been 
high by European standards. The standard variable rate on new mortgage loans in 
Ireland stood at 3.41 per cent as of Q3 2017; this is down slightly year-on-year 
from 3.47 in Q3 2016 but a moderate increase over the first two quarters of 
2017. However, comparing Irish new house purchase loans relative to other 
Eurozone economies, it can be seen that new lending rates are the highest of the 
comparison group (Figure 19). As of August 2017, interest rates on new house 
purchase in Ireland were nearly 1.2 per cent higher than the median of the other 
countries presented. This gap has widened since mid-2014 when Irish interest 
rates began to decouple from the ECB policy rate. 
 
FIGURE 19 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS  
– EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the new 
business standard variable rate is only for new drawdowns.  
 
A similar picture emerges in relation to corporate interest rates. Figure 20 
presents the interest rates on new business loans for non-financial corporations 
in Ireland relative to the average for the Eurozone. Two series are presented: 1) 
covering all loans and 2) capturing loans of < €250,000, which is used as a proxy 
for loans for SMEs. In August 2017, the average rate on new loans for all Irish 
corporates was 2.54 per cent and the Eurozone average was 1.74 per cent. For 
small Irish corporate loans, the interest rate in June 2017 was 5.2 per cent 
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compared to the Eurozone average of 2.52 per cent. Interest rates are down year-
on-year for small corporates but remain considerably higher than for their 
European peers.  
 
FIGURE 20 INTEREST RATES ON LOANS TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS – EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
 
 
Sources:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans less than €250,000. 
 
The very evident dislocation in the transmission of policy rates to lending rates in 
Ireland which has occurred since 2014 poses challenges for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. Box 3 below discusses the implications for Ireland of the current 
ECB policy stance and what risks might accompany a normalisation of policy 
rates.  
 
BOX 3  TOWARDS A NORMALISATION OF MONETARY POLICY? UNDERSTANDING THE ECB POLICY 
STANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR IRELAND 
Overview 
In line with moves by the US Federal Reserve, Bank of England and Bank of Japan, the 
European Central Bank began lowering policy rates in response to the dramatic 
deterioration in financial and economic conditions following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. The ECB aggressively reduced policy rates between July 2008 and May 
2009 by 325 basis points to just over 1 per cent (MRO).14 Figure A below plots the 
evolution of the three main ECB policy rates (MRO, deposit facility and MLF) from 2003  
 
 
                                                          
 
14  Stark (2009) ‘Monetary policy, before, during and after the financial crisis’, Speech at Tubingen University.  
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to present. The explicit objective of the European Central Bank in terms of monetary 
policy operations is to ensure price stability as measured by a Eurozone inflation rate of 
close to, but below, 2 per cent over the medium term. However, the ongoing sovereign 
debt and banking crises, coupled with the backdrop of muted inflation, led to a major 
expansion in both the toolkit and the monetary policy stance of the ECB. Further rate 
reductions followed through to March 2016 when the deposit rate was set to -0.4 per 
cent, the MRO to 0, and the MLF to 0.25 per cent.15 
 
FIGURE A  EVOLUTION OF ECB POLICY RATES (%) 
 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank. 
 
Faced with the dual challenge of operating monetary policy at the zero lower bound as well as 
the unprecedented financial and economic crisis in the Eurozone, the ECB introduced a range 
of unconventional monetary policy instruments to address the risks to persistent low inflation. 
The most extensive of these was the series of Asset Purchase Programmes which act to 
purchase public and private securities in the secondary market. Four main programmes are 
operational: a corporate sector purchase programme; a public sector purchase programme; 
an asset backed securities purchase programme; and a series of covered bond purchase 
programmes. Across the programmes, between April 2016 to March 2017, the monthly net 
purchases amounted to €80 billion up from €60 billion over the period March 2015 to March  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
15  The ECB maintains three key interest rates. First, the interest rate on the main refinancing operations (MRO), 
provides the bulk of liquidity to the banking system. Second, the rate on the deposit facility for banks to make 
overnight deposits with the Eurosystem and finally the rate on the marginal lending facility, which offers overnight 
credit to banks from the Eurosystem. 
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2016. While a full overview of these programmes and their effectiveness is outside the scope 
of this box, the measures can certainly be said to have stabilised financial markets as well as 
providing a reduction in borrowing costs for banks and sovereigns across the Eurozone.16 
Recent Monetary Policy Developments 
At the recent Governing Council meeting in October, the ECB voted to maintain key policy 
interest rates at historic levels and their forward guidance indicated rates would remain at the 
current level for the foreseeable future, more specifically past the duration of the current 
asset purchase programme.17 However, in a first move towards weaning the European 
economy off the extensive monetary stimulus, in relation to the APP, the ECB indicated a 
reduction in the level of net asset purchases from the current €60 billion per month to €30 
billion per month out to end September 2018. The adjustment to the asset purchase 
programme reflects the ECB’s growing confidence in the gradual convergence of inflation 
rates towards the stated objective. This confidence is fuelled by the ongoing recovery as well 
as the increase in observed measures of underlying inflation. However, the ECB noted that 
domestic price pressures continued to be muted and the economic outlook as well as the path 
of inflation continue to require extensive monetary support. They also indicated a willingness 
to re-invigorate the APP and increase the size of the intervention if the outlook deteriorates 
or if financial conditions become inconsistent with a sustained adjustment in the inflation 
path. 
 
FIGURE B  EUROZONE INFLATION (%) 
 
 
 
Sources:  ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
                                                          
 
16  European Central Bank (2015) ‘The Governing Council’s Expanded Asset Purchase Programme’, Box 1, Monthly 
Bulletin, Issue 1.  
17  European Central Bank (2017), Press Release to Accompany Governing Council Briefing, 27/10/2017. 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
19
97
Ja
n
19
97
Se
p
19
98
M
ay
19
99
Ja
n
19
99
Se
p
20
00
M
ay
20
01
Ja
n
20
01
Se
p
20
02
M
ay
20
03
Ja
n
20
03
Se
p
20
04
M
ay
20
05
Ja
n
20
05
Se
p
20
06
M
ay
20
07
Ja
n
20
07
Se
p
20
08
M
ay
20
09
Ja
n
20
09
Se
p
20
10
M
ay
20
11
Ja
n
20
11
Se
p
20
12
M
ay
20
13
Ja
n
20
13
Se
p
20
14
M
ay
20
15
Ja
n
20
15
Se
p
20
16
M
ay
20
17
Ja
n
20
17
Se
p
HICP ECB Target
32 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 17   
 
 
Given the 2017 moves by the US Federal Reserve to raise base policy rates and provide 
forward guidance for future rate rises, the focus must be on when the ECB will begin the 
process of further normalisation. 
Exploring the consequences for Ireland 
While it is not necessarily on the immediate horizon, it is noteworthy to explore what the 
consequences of any re-normalisation of monetary policy operations would be for Ireland. The 
effects of a reduction in non-standard instruments as well as increases in policy interest rates, 
by decreasing the volume of liquidity and increasing the cost of finance, are twofold: 1) they 
have an impact on sovereign and financial institution funding and lending and 2) they have an 
impact on real economic activity through households and firms.  
In terms of the funding activity, the Irish State has been a beneficiary of the ECB asset 
purchase programme as this has reduced yields on government debt allowing a reduction in 
the cost of servicing the state liabilities. The low funding cost environment also provides 
financial institutions with the opportunity to lower their cost of financing – in particular on 
low yielding deposits – and increase their lending margins. If monetary policy was to become 
less accommodative and funding costs were to rise, this would inevitably increase the cost of 
financing to the State as well as increasing the cost of funds for financial institutions which 
have a negative influence on the public finances, as well as potentially act as a limiting factor 
on lending. From a fiscal policy perspective, this would limit the fiscal space available in future 
budgets. However it must be noted that the overall economy and the public finances are in a 
much better position currently so any reversal in rates may not lead to a significant increase in 
sovereign borrowing costs. 
 
In regard to the real activity of households and enterprises, if any increase in the policy rate 
were to be passed through to households or firms this would ultimately act to reduce their 
consumption of goods and services as well as moderating the investment activity of firms. This 
would occur primarily though the cost of new loans but it would also increase the debt service 
burden of Irish households’ and firms’ existing liabilities. As both of these groups are highly 
indebted from the Irish crisis, any increase in the cost of credit could lead to higher levels of 
loan defaults. In particular for households with large debt overhangs from the crisis, any 
increase in rates could seriously affect their ability to service debts and in turn lower their 
consumption. 
 
Recent research by Fasanios et al. (2017) shows that a 1 to 2 per cent interest rate rise in 
interest rates for Irish households reduces the disposable income after debt repayments of a 
typical borrower by between 2 and 4 per cent, with larger impacts for younger borrowers. 
Furthermore, Byrne et al. (2017) find a strong and highly statistically significant impact of 
interest rates on mortgage default in Ireland, with a 1 per cent reduction in instalment 
associated with a 5.8 per cent decrease in the likelihood of default over the following year. 
They show that Irish tracker mortgage borrowers (whose interest rate is a fixed margin over 
the ECB rate) have benefited from the pass-through of the reductions in the policy rate and 
this has provided an affordability boost to these borrowers which protected against default 
relative to other variable rate holders. As these borrowers are highly indebted, any significant 
rate reversal would inevitably put pressure on their ability to service loans. Given the  
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contribution of consumption to Irish growth currently, any such reduction in loan affordability 
may act as a drag on household spending. 
 
Assessing the extent to which rate rises would be passed through is complicated in Ireland 
due to the current structure of the banking market. The interest rates on most mortgage, 
consumer and corporate loans in Ireland are variable in nature, thereby allowing financial 
institutions to pass through rate changes directly to households. The Central Bank’s most 
recent Household Credit Market Report shows that approximately 86 per cent of mortgages 
are on a variable interest rate (either standard variable or tracker). While historically Irish 
banks would pass on policy rate changes (both positive and negative) to customers, since the 
beginning of 2009, this transmission channel has broken down and lending rates have 
remained stubbornly high in the face of ECB rate reductions. Figure C below clearly shows 
how the policy rate pass-through to loans across all types of borrower (consumer, mortgage 
and corporate) has broken down in recent years.  
 
FIGURE C  ECB POLICY RATE PASS-THROUGH TO IRISH LENDING RATES (%) 
 
 
 
Sources:  ECB and Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
While a number of factors are undoubtedly contributing to the high lending rates in Ireland 
such as high credit risk, cost of funding and regulatory changes, and the high share of loss 
making tracker loans on the banks’ books, the reduction in the degree of competition in the 
market is undoubtedly playing a role (Goggin et al., 2011). McQuinn and Morley (2015) find 
that the main reason for the breakdown in pass-through between the policy rate and the 
standard variable rate in Ireland is weak competition in the Irish financial sector. 
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Concluding remarks 
The breakdown in the pass-through relationship between policy rates and market rates makes 
it difficult to predict the extent to which future policy rate increases will be passed through to 
new lending rates as well as to rates on existing loans. Financial institutions may, for example, 
elect not to pass on the full amount of policy rate increases if they are seeking to grow market 
share or are limited by political economy considerations. However, given the highly indebted 
nature of Irish households and firms, the already high interest rates by European standards, 
and the subdued competitive pressures in the Irish banking market, it is likely ECB policy rate 
normalisation would have a more negative effect on the Irish economy than would be the 
case for other European economies if a historical 1:1 pass-through is applied to already high 
lending rates. A continued policy focus on reducing sovereign and private sector 
indebtedness, as well as policies to increase competition in banking, can act to moderate the 
impact of any policy rate rises. 
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Household and firm deposits 
In August 2017, household and non-financial corporate deposits stood at €100.2 
billion and €41.2 billion respectively, up from €96.3 billion and €39.4 billion year-
on-year. Loan-to-deposit ratios, presented in Figure 21, continued to be less than 
1 for households indicating they are net funders of the Irish banking sector. 
Corporate deposits remain lower than loans indicating they are net borrowers 
from the Irish banking sector.  
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FIGURE 21 LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT RATIOS FOR IRISH HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS  
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland data. Table A.1 columns 1, 5, 12, 15. It must be noted that these loans and deposits relate to only 
 those held on resident credit institutions reporting to the Central Bank of Ireland’s Credit, Money and Banking data. 
 Securitised loans serviced by these institutions are not included in the above calculations.  
 
Loan performance 
The improvement in the Irish labour market, a reduction in the share of 
borrowers in negative equity and ongoing policy efforts towards loan 
modification has led to a marked fall in the share of primary dwelling houses 
(PDH) mortgage loans in arrears. As of Q2 2017, the share of loans in arrears 
stood at 7.1 per cent, down marginally on the previous quarter and down from 
7.8 per cent year-on-year. This constitutes a total of 10.6 per cent of the balance 
of outstanding PDH mortgages. The default rate on buy-to-let (BTL) loans has also 
reduced but remains high. The improving economy should over time help arrears 
to fall to more normal levels. However, due to the high share of delinquent 
accounts in long-term arrears, continued policy action by the banking sector to 
deal with these legacies is required.  
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FIGURE 22 IRISH HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE ACCOUNTS IN ARREARS BY TYPE OF LOAN (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Mortgage Arrears Statistics. 
Notes:  PDH refers to principal dwelling houses loans while BTL are buy-to-let loans. Loans are defined in arrears if they are greater 
than 90 days past due on their payments.  
 
Summary of financial conditions 
While monetary conditions across the Eurozone have stabilised on foot of 
expansive monetary policy, Irish households and corporates continue to pay 
higher interest rates on mortgages and other loans. This acts as a drag on 
investment and consumption. In terms of new lending, mortgage activity is 
continuing to grow rapidly as activity in the property market increases. While the 
increasing share of borrowers taking high LTV loans is noteworthy, the protection 
of the Central Banks’ strict, but well calibrated, macroprudential loan-to-income 
ratio should limit the build-up of vulnerabilities. 
 
PRICES AND EARNINGS 
The beginning of 2017 saw some upward pressure in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) yet these increases continue to remain well below historical levels. For the 
second half of the year, as can be seen in Figure 23, inflation rates for June and 
July were -0.4 and -0.2 per cent respectively. In the most recent data, year-on-
year changes in the CPI yielded increases of 0.4 and 0.2 per cent in August and 
September 2017, accelerating to 0.6 per cent in October. The Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP) rose by 0.4 per cent in August and 0.2 per cent in 
September, most recently showing a third consecutive rise, compared to last 
year, of 0.5 per cent for October. The increase in overall prices in October 2017 
was driven mainly by housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (up 3.1 per 
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cent from October 2016), restaurants and hotels (up 2.7 per cent from October 
2016) and education (up 1.8 per cent from October 2016). 
 
Deflationary factors include continued decreases in prices of clothing and 
footwear (down 4.7 per cent year-on-year to October 2017) and furnishings, 
household equipment and routine household maintenance (down 3.6 per cent 
year-on-year to October 2017). Prices for recreation and culture as well as prices 
for food and non-alcoholic beverages both fell by 1.2 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 23 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The underlying trends in the CPI (Figure 24) have been steady for some time with 
goods contributing negatively to the overall inflation rate since early in 2013 
while the services component continues to exert a positive effect on inflation. If 
we examine the CPI of goods in particular, prices have fallen to a level not 
observed since February 2000. For the most part, this trend is continuing in 2017 
but has weakened slightly. Should this trend persist, goods prices will continue to 
exert further downward pressure on the CPI over the short term.  
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FIGURE 24 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Second quarter earnings data from the CSO show that seasonally-adjusted 
Average Hourly Earnings increased by 0.5 per cent compared to the previous 
quarter. On an annual basis, earnings increased by 2.2 per cent up to €22.41. The 
largest increase, seen in Q2 2017, was observed in the administration and 
support service sector rising by 5.1 per cent compared to the previous year. 
Other notable increases occurred in the professional, scientific and technical as 
well as the wholesale and retail trade sectors, earnings per hour rising by 3.7 per 
cent and 3.5 per cent respectively. This is consistent with the growing demand for 
labour in these sectors (Figure 25).  
 
FIGURE 25  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER MONTH (€) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
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As economic activity in the broader economy has recovered, pressures are 
beginning to appear in the labour market, reflected in accelerating rates of 
average earnings growth. Since Q2 2016, rising measures of average earnings per 
hour and the average weekly earnings have hastened, pointing towards improved 
households earnings. As of Q2 2017, the average weekly earnings, on a 
seasonally-adjusted basis, stood at €723.74; this represents a modest increase 
from €721.74 in Q1 2017. 
 
The highest weekly wages in Q2 2017 were in financial services and ICT sectors at 
€1,114 and €1,090 respectively. On an annualised basis, wage growth appears to 
be moderate in Q2 2017 in the manufacturing sector with growth of 0.5 per cent, 
while construction earnings fell -3.3 per cent on an annualised basis. The fall in 
construction wages may reflect compositional issues. Earnings in the wholesale 
and retail sector grew by 3.3 per cent on an annualised basis, up from 1.9 per 
cent in the previous quarter. Figure 26 presents a four-quarter moving average 
growth rate by sector to display the trends over time in earnings pressures. There 
is a positive trend overall with earnings increasing by 1.9 per cent in Q2 2017. 
Public sector earnings are also increasing on an annualised basis. This partially 
reflects a base effect as there was a marked decline in earnings in 2016. The 
decline in 2016 may also be due to compositional issues in the public sector 
workforce. 
 
FIGURE 26 FOUR-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE GROWTH BY SECTOR IN WEEKLY EARNINGS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Overall, trends in recent data indicate that some price and earnings pressures are 
emerging. Consumer prices have recently begun to increase, while housing costs 
are continuing to rise. However, the global economy still faces low inflation rates 
mainly due to extremely low oil prices since 2014. Overall, therefore, we expect 
consumer prices to increase moderately by 0.6 per cent this year and 1.4 per cent 
in 2018. We forecast earnings to rise by 2.8 per cent this year and 3 per cent in 
2018. As wages increase, it will be important to ensure that the Irish economy 
does not witness a deterioration in competitiveness akin to that experienced 
prior to 2007. 
 
TABLE 2  INFLATION MEASURES 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 Annual % Change  
CPI -0.3 0 0.6 1.4 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
DEMAND 
Household Sector Consumption  
Strong growth in domestic consumption has been one of the main contributions 
to the recent expansion in economic activity. The most up-to-date quarterly 
National Accounts show that on an annualised basis, personal consumption 
expenditure increased by 1.3 per cent in Quarter 2, 2017, down from 2.7 per cent 
in the previous quarter. On a quarter-on-quarter basis, consumption spending fell 
marginally. The reduction in the growth rate may be due to the increased number 
of cars imported at a lower cost from the UK. We discuss this in more detail 
below in the context of the retail sales data. Despite this development, we still 
see improvements in household balance sheets, the persistent fall in 
unemployment and modest increases in disposable incomes, as providing a 
supportive environment for further consumption growth. 
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FIGURE 27  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT MARKET 
PRICES AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Developments in retail sales act as important leading indicators for household 
consumption. These various retail sale indices provide a detailed snapshot of 
exactly which goods and services households are purchasing and identifies where 
overall growth is stemming from. Table 3 presents retail sales for selected items 
in terms of the annual growth rate in the volume of sales. For all businesses, retail 
sales are up 1.2 per cent in the year to September 2017. However, this 
reasonably modest increase masks considerable variation across different types 
of goods. 
 
TABLE 3 ANNUAL GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (JULY 2017) 
Retail Business – NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales 
  Annual % change 
Motor trades -19.7 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores)  6.9 
Department stores  5.5 
Clothing, Footwear and Textiles 2.7 
Furniture and lighting 16.1 
All businesses excl. motor trades 7.8 
All businesses 1.2 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The decline in retail sales for motor cars is impacted by the falling value of 
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data, 44,503 second-hand cars from the UK were purchased by Irish citizens for 
the first half of 2017, representing a 45.9 per cent rise year-on-year on the 
numbers purchased in 2016. Considering retail sales without motor trade, we see 
a rapid increase in non-specialised stores (up 6.9 per cent year-on-year) and 
furniture and lighting (up 16.1 per cent year-on-year). The recovery in the 
housing market would appear to be feeding in to the expenditure on furniture 
and lighting. The overall trends in retails sales are documented in Figure 28. This 
chart presents a three-month rolling average of retail sales for total sales, sales 
excluding the motor trade, and for household equipment. Of note is the high 
growth in household equipment (12.6 per cent in September) and the continued 
strength of all retail sales excluding the motor trade (7.3 per cent in September).  
 
FIGURE 28  AVERAGE GROWTH IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005 = 100) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 29 presents the ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index which tracks the 
monthly views of households on their current and future economic perspectives. 
While international considerations were likely to have contributed to a 
weakening of consumer sentiment in mid to late 2016, from February to October 
2017 the monthly index followed an overall positive trend. In September 2017 
the Index reached its highest level (118.6 index points) since February last 
year, while declining marginally in October (118.0 index points).  
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FIGURE 29 ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS 
 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC. 
 
Irish household net worth continues to grow into Quarter 2, 2017 as loan 
repayments reduce the stock of outstanding liabilities and rising asset prices raise 
the total value of domestic balance sheets. The trend in the overall position of 
Irish households’ net worth, which is the stock of financial and housing assets 
minus the stock of liabilities, is presented in Figure 30. The financial crisis 
considerably decreased net worth as housing assets fell sharply in value. The 
recovery in the housing market has contributed to a rise in housing wealth which 
has improved overall net worth. Financial assets have grown modestly since 
2010. As households continue to pay down debt balances, liabilities continue to 
decline. 
 
FIGURE 30  IRISH HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH (€ BILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Financial Accounts. 
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In general, we expect household consumption to continue to be a strong 
determinant of domestic economic activity as household balance sheets are 
repaired through deleveraging and as Irish income levels rise modestly. We 
therefore expect consumption expenditure to grow by 2.8 per cent this year and 
2.9 per cent in 2018.  
 
Property market developments 
The rate of increase in national property prices has been rising since the second 
half of 2016. This trend saw double digit growth rates in May of this year. Figure 
31 plots the year-on-year changes in residential property prices. The data are split 
out by property type as well as for the overall index. In August and September 
2017 property prices were up year-on-year by 11.8 per cent and 12.8 per cent, 
the fastest growth rate in over two years. As noted in McQuinn (2017), 
movements in house prices can be explained by improving economic conditions 
such as falling unemployment rates, an accommodative monetary policy regime 
and acute shortages of housing supply. Nevertheless, property prices remain 23.7 
per cent lower than the peak reached in February 2007.  
 
FIGURE 31 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
House price developments are presented in Figure 32 on a geographic basis 
splitting out Dublin and the rest of Ireland. As housing pressures are most acute 
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the deceleration of price growth in early 2015 was much more acute in Dublin 
than outside the capital. Among other factors, this potentially reflects the fact 
that the Central Bank’s macroprudential rules in the housing market were more 
binding for Dublin borrowers who needed to use high loan-to-value and loan-to-
income ratios to purchase housing. Kinghan et al. (2017) provide some recent 
evidence of this. Furthermore, the looser loan-to-income cap for first time buyers 
purchasing properties less than €220,000 would have meant stricter limits in 
Dublin where average prices were higher. Prices in the rest of the country have 
been growing very rapidly, posting double digit growth every month with one 
exception since July 2016. Prices in Dublin grew at 12.2 per cent in the year to 
September 2017 suggesting an acceleration in price increases in the capital where 
demand still greatly exceeds supply. 
 
FIGURE 32 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH BY REGION (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
House price expectations can be gleaned from Figure 33 which plots the latest 
ESRI/AIB Housing Market Indicator. The index, which comprises questions on 
attitudes to buying and selling property as well as expectations of house prices 12 
months from now, has started to trend upwards from the mid-point of 2016. This 
growth continued into Quarter 3 of 2017, where a growing share of households 
believe the timing for selling a house has improved and expect house prices to 
increase further over the next 12 months. 
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FIGURE 33 ESRI/AIB HOUSE PRICE INDEX (BASE JULY 2013 = 100) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Irish house prices rose at the fifth fastest pace among OECD countries in the 
second quarter of 2017, based on year-on-year growth. According to the OECD 
House Price Index (Figure 34), house prices in Ireland grew at a similar growth 
rate as in Australia (8.6 per cent) with only Iceland (25.7 per cent), Canada (12.6 
per cent) and Czech Republic (10.6 per cent) growing faster. This is well above the 
average growth rates for the entire OECD (3.7 per cent) and Euro Area (2.7 per 
cent) and contrasts with housing market developments in countries such as 
Greece (-2.2 per cent), Italy (-1.3 per cent) and South Korea (-0.5 per cent). In a 
paper featured in this Commentary, McQuinn (2017) analyses the current state of 
Irish house prices. Estimates of the paper suggest that real Irish house prices are 
likely to grow by 20 per cent between 2017 and 2020. 
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FIGURE 34 OECD TOP TEN FASTEST GROWING HOUSING MARKETS, % GROWTH 
 
 
Source:  OECD. 
 
While it is clear that excess demand in the Irish housing market is leading to rapid 
increases in house prices, similar challenges are also being faced in the rental 
market where rents are also growing rapidly. The latest data from the RTB Rental 
Index confirm that rents nationally continue to increase at a significant rate. 
Rents in Quarter 2, 2017, nationally, increased by 7 per cent on an annual basis 
continuing the rise that has been observed since early 2013, as can be seen from 
Figure 35. While it does appear that there is some moderation in the rate of 
growth in Dublin, rents are now above their pre-crisis peak experienced in 
Quarter 4, 2007. Pressures in the rental market will continue to reduce housing 
affordability. 
 
FIGURE 35 RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES BOARD NATIONAL RENTAL INDEX (BASE Q3 2007 = 100), ANNUAL 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
 
 
Sources:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
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As McQuinn (2017) notes, along with demand-side pressures, price pressures are 
also due to the acute shortage of housing supply. Duffy et al. (2016)18 note that 
approximately 35,000 units are needed per annum to keep up with demand due 
to demographics and market fundamentals. Given that supply needs have not 
been satisfied for several years, the number of units needs to be exceeded in the 
short run in order for supply to ‘catch up’.  
 
The ESB connections data can be used as a proxy for completions; this indicator 
shows the number of homes that become connected to the electricity grid and 
thus it also includes unfinished housing developments which have been 
reactivated. In 2016 less than 15,000 completions were supplied and from 
January to September 2017 about 13,500 units became available in the market. 
However, it does appear that housing supply is finally beginning to respond to 
increased demand. In every month of 2017 housing completions were higher 
than in the same month over the previous two years. With continued demand-
side pressures and a recovering financial sector leading to better access to credit, 
we expect completions to continue to rise. We forecast that 19,500 units will be 
finalised in 2017, with the number increasing to 24,000 units in 2018. 
 
FIGURE 36 MONTHLY LEVELS OF HOUSING SUPPLY 
 
 
Sources:  Department of Housing Planning and Local Government and QEC calculations. 
 
 
                                                          
 
18  Duffy, D., N. McInerney and K. McQuinn (2016). ‘Macroprudential policy in a recovering property market: too much 
too soon?’ International Journal of Housing Policy, Vol. 16, Issue 4, pp. 491-523. 
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SUPPLY 
Investment 
The recent volatility in the National Accounts, which are driven by company 
specific strategies and globalisation effects, has made it difficult to understand 
patterns in Irish capital investments. Total Investment as measured by Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) increased in 2014, 2015, and 2016 as shown by 
Figure 37. In 2016, annual growth was 61 per cent, up from 28 per cent in 2015. 
Quarterly growth rates display even more volatility with intangible assets varying 
considerably quarter-on-quarter. The latest quarterly data available, Q2 2017, 
indicate a fall in investment on a quarter-on-quarter basis. However, this is driven 
mainly by a reduction in the intangible assets category. 
 
FIGURE 37  COMPONENTS OF INVESTMENT AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL (€MILLION) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
 
To address the globalisation and multinational company distortions to investment 
in Ireland, the CSO have provided an adjusted series for Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation on a quarterly basis, modified GFCF, which adjusts for the effects of 
trade in aircraft by aircraft leasing companies and the importation of intellectual 
property. The adjusted figures overall and the figures for building and 
construction, intangibles and machinery and equipment are presented in Figure 
38. It can be seen that the adjusted data display a much more stable growth 
pattern with an upward trend evident from mid-2015 onwards. For the year 
2016, the overall level of GFCF is on average 380 per cent higher than the 
modified figures for intangibles, and 50 per cent higher for machinery and 
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investment. Building and construction is unchanged in the modified accounts. On 
an annualised basis, overall modified investment is up 23 per cent in the year to 
Q1 2017. This is composed of an increase of 27 per cent in buildings and 
construction, a 14 per cent decline in machinery and equipment and a 73 per 
cent increase in intangibles. 
 
FIGURE 38 MODIFIED GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION (€MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat Countries included in comparison are: BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, GR, ES, FR, HR (Croatia), IT, CY, LT, LV, HU, NL, AT, PL, 
PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK.  
 
While the modified figures somewhat address the national accounting challenges 
posed by certain multinationals’ investment activity, they do not provide a guide 
for the investment activity undertaken by Irish companies. Exploring the 
investment patterns of domestic enterprises is important as their behaviour is 
linked to underlying developments in the Irish economy and are likely to be more 
responsive to different economic shocks such as Brexit. To attempt to get a better 
understanding of the investment flows in this regard, Figure 39 presents the 
change in capital acquisitions in industry in Ireland from 2009-2016. 
 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Intangible Assets Machinery and Equipment Building and Construction GFCF
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 7  |  51  
FIGURE 39 PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CAPITAL ACQUISITIONS IN INDUSTRY (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Capital Acquisitions Data. 
 
While it can be seen that investment for all industrial firms has been growing 
steadily from 2012, if the computer, chemical and pharma sectors are excluded, a 
declining growth rate is evident from 2014. In fact industrial investment actually 
declined marginally in 2016 excluding these sectors. An even closer 
understanding into what is happening domestically can be gleaned from 
considering investment in the food and beverages sector which is majority Irish-
owned. This sector is also likely to be affected by Brexit as a considerable portion 
of agri-food exports would go to the UK. Lawless et al. (2017) show that just 
under 50 per cent of Irish food exports go to the UK. The trend in investment in 
the food and beverage sectors has been negative since 2014. 
 
Over a longer-term perspective, falling investment in Irish industry represents a 
challenge in terms of maintaining capital-labour ratios and ensuring productivity 
growth. Indeed, in the credit constrained environment following the banking 
crisis is it likely that many firms have foregone investment over the past decade 
and delayed making replacements of machinery and equipment. Some important 
domestic-facing sectors in Ireland are operating at capital-labour ratios well 
below 2010 levels (Figure 40) including accommodation and food services, 
construction, transport and agriculture. These trends are masked when we 
consider the overall capital-labour ratios which are heavily influenced by the 
recent investment flows in multinational dominated sectors. 
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FIGURE 40 CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIOS FOR IRISH SECTORS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data. 
 
The low capital-labour ratios in indigenous sectors may hint at an investment gap 
which suggests that, as the economy continues to grow, these companies may 
increase investment spending. However, the uncertainty surrounding Brexit may 
give rise to some hesitancy in committing capital.  
 
To provide some insight into the current plans of enterprises, the Markit 
Purchasing Managers’ Index, provides another indicator of activity in the 
manufacturing, services and construction sectors. It is shown in Figure 41. A 
reading above 50 indicates an expansion and, in the first few months of 2017, we 
can see that the index is beginning to trend upwards for construction and 
remains well above 50 for manufacturing and services. The most recent data for 
August 2017 suggest the strength of the construction purchasing activity has 
increased marginally over that registered in July.  
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FIGURE 41 BUSINESS AND CONSTRUCTION PMI FOR IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
 
While some evidence exists of an investment gap in Ireland for domestic 
enterprises, the generalised level of uncertainty in the global environment and 
the ongoing Brexit discussions is potentially causing some headwinds for 
investment planning. This may be reflected in a weakening of the business 
outlook for purchasing activity as monitored by the Markit index presented in 
Figure 42. For both manufacturing and services activity the most recent June 
2017 data indicate a softening of activity. 
 
FIGURE 42 FORWARD-LOOKING INDICATORS FOR PURCHASING ACTIVITY  
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
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Notwithstanding the slight weakening of the construction Purchasing Managers’ 
Index and international uncertainties, the increased trend in building investment 
is set to continue as housing supply increases, underpinned by strong housing 
demand and a supportive policy context.  
 
Consequently, we remain optimistic about overall investment in 2017 and 2018, 
despite the international uncertainties. In particular, we expect annual average 
growth in investment of 15.9 per cent in 2017 and 12 per cent in 2018.  
 
LABOUR MARKET 
Unemployment 
As the Irish economy registers strong growth in 2017, the number of people out 
of work continues to decline in a persistent manner through 2017. On a 
seasonally-adjusted basis the Live Register recorded a monthly decrease of 2,400 
(-1.0 per cent) in October 2017, resulting in a seasonally-adjusted total of 
246,900. This represents an annual decrease of 40,300 (-14.3 per cent). As can be 
seen from Figure 44, the number of persons on the Live Register in October 2017 
is now the lowest number recorded in the seasonally-adjusted series since 
October 2008. 
 
FIGURE 44 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: JANUARY 2006 TO AUGUST 2017 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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The share of long-term unemployed represented 43.0 per cent of total 
unemployment in October 2017 compared to 45.1 per cent in October 2016. 
Whereas during the initial phase of the economic recovery, it was the shorter-
term unemployed who had the largest decline in the Live Register, since mid-
2015 it is those in longer-term unemployment who are now experiencing the 
more significant falls. On a yearly basis, long-term unemployment fell by 18.6 per 
cent in October 2017 and short-term unemployment fell by 11.2 per cent. 
 
In terms of the last occupation held by those on the Live Register, Table 4 
summarises the annual change between 2016 and 2017. 
 
TABLE 4  PERSONS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER CLASSIFIED BY LAST HELD OCCUPATION 
Sector 2016 M08 2017 M08  % Change 
Managers and administrators 13.1 11.4 -13.2 
Professional 16.5 14.3 -13.3 
Associate professional and technical 8.6 7.7 -10.3 
Clerical and secretarial 27.9 24.6 -11.9 
Craft and related 50.3 41.7 -17.1 
Personal and protective services 35.6 30.7 -13.7 
Sales 29.7 24.9 -16.2 
Plant and machine operatives 43.9 36.8 -16.3 
Other broad occupational groups 33.4 29.4 -12.0 
No occupation 17.7 15.0 -15.2 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Notwithstanding the recent pick-up in the construction sector, the occupational 
group with the largest number of people on the Live Register is still the craft and 
related sector. However, the craft and related sector also registers the largest 
decrease over the past year. 
 
On a month-to-month basis, the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate fell 
marginally to 6.0 per cent in October from 6.1 per cent in September 2017. The 
figure is down from 7.2 per cent in October 2016.  
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FIGURE 45 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY QUARTER (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Employment 
Employment in the Irish economy continues to increase with 48,100 jobs being 
added in the year in the second quarter of 2017 (+2.4 per cent), bringing the 
number of persons in employment to 2,063,000. The largest year-on-year growth 
rates were recorded in the construction (+7.7 per cent) and information and 
communication (+9.2 per cent) sectors. Full-time employment increased by 
77,800 (+5.0 per cent) to 1,630,800 during the same period and accounted for 
79.0 per cent of total employment in Quarter 2, 2017. On the other hand, part-
time employment fell by 29,700 (-6.4 per cent) to 432,200 and accounted for 21.0 
per cent of total employment.  
 
Over the longer-term, the number of persons in employment has increased by 
201,700 (+10.8 per cent) between Quarter 2, 2011 and Quarter 2, 2017. Full-time 
employment (+207,000) accounted for virtually all of this increase while there 
was a very slight increase in part-time employment. This indicates some 
significant changes in the composition of employment in the Irish labour market.  
 
As the economy recovers and the level of employment improves, it becomes 
more important to consider the quality of employment and the pace of wage 
growth. Kelly and Barrett (2017)19 found that during the recession years, Ireland 
experienced an increase in atypical work (part-time and temporary contracts) 
among the holders of new jobs. They also found evidence that, despite being 
 
                                                          
 
19  Kelly, E. and A. Barrett (2017). ‘Recent Developments in the Irish Labour Market: Is it All Good News?’, Institute of 
Labour Economics, IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 10541. 
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lower than in the recession, the likelihood of a new job being atypical persisted 
into the first years of the recovery (2014-2015), remaining above pre-crisis levels. 
 
Growth in nominal wages has remained subdued not only in Ireland but also 
throughout the Eurozone,20 suggesting that among other factors a significant 
degree of labour market slack21 may persist. The unemployment rate, as defined 
by the International Labour Organization, is based on a narrow definition of 
labour underutilisation - ILO considers unemployed those who are (i) without 
work; (ii) available to start working within two weeks; and (iii) actively seeking 
work. To better access the degree of labour market slack we look at the ‘potential 
additional labour force’ (those who are not actively seeking work despite being 
available and those actively seeking work but who are available to start working 
within two weeks) and the ‘underemployed’ (those working less hours than they 
would like). Figure 46 shows these indicators have only approached pre-crisis 
levels since Q4 2016. In the fourth quarter of 2008 there were 81,400 
underemployed people, in the second quarter of 2012 this number jumped to 
156,600 and only fell below the 90,000 level in the second quarter of 2017. 
Before 2009 the potential additional labour force was well below the 30,000 level 
while in the second quarter of 2013 it reached 60,000. The most recent CSO 
release suggests the potential additional labour force is now 34,000. 
 
This analysis at the aggregate level contrasts somewhat with the findings in an 
article in the present Commentary by Redmond and Whelan (2017). In conducting 
micro-level analysis of the Irish labour market, Redmond and Whelan (2017) 
examine the nature of current employment in Ireland with respect to the 
intensity of use of certain skills and the mismatch between the skills possessed by 
employees and those required to do their jobs. Their findings suggest that, while 
there are future sources of labour supply of those currently experiencing 
unemployment, it is unlikely that this group alone will fully meet the increased 
labour demands of the Irish economy. 
 
 
                                                          
 
20  ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 3 / 2017. 
21  ECB President Mario Draghi speech during the 27th European Banking Congress in Frankfurt, Germany November 17, 
2017. 
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FIGURE 46 UNDEREMPLOYED PERSONS AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER (‘000) BY QUARTER 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The CSO Potential Labour Supply (PLS4) indicator can be used as a more broad 
measure of underemployment. This indicator includes unemployed people, 
people who are not actively seeking work, people who are unavailable to take up 
work within two weeks and people who are underemployed.  
 
In Q2 2012 the PLS4 was 25.9 per cent, which was almost twice the official 
unemployment rate at that time. The PLS4 only reached the pre-crisis rate (13.4 
per cent) in Q4 2016. This improvement in the Irish labour market may have to 
take place over a longer period of time before it translates into more dynamic 
wage growth. As ECB president Mario Draghi (2017)22 stated recently ‘as the 
labor market tightens and uncertainty falls, the relationship between slack and 
wage growth should begin reasserting itself’. 
 
 
                                                          
 
22  ECB President Mario Draghi speech during the 27th European Banking Congress in Frankfurt, Germany November 17, 
2017. 
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FIGURE 47 POTENTIAL SUPPLY OF LABOUR (%) BY QUARTER 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In an Irish context, Linehan et al. (2017)23 find that there is a non-linear 
relationship between wage growth and unemployment. Using data from Q1 1999 
to Q2 2017 the authors find that real wage growth is generally flat in the 5 to 10 
per cent unemployment rate range, whereas outside this range the sensitivity of 
real wages is considerably larger. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
As the Irish economy continues to perform strongly and the construction sector 
recovers, we believe that the unemployment rate will average 6.2 per cent 
through 2017 and 5.4 per cent through 2018. Employment is set to exceed 2.07 
million by the end of 2017 and increase to 2.12 million by the end of 2018. 
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
The latest taxation receipts reflect significant increases for the year to date in 
almost all the major tax headings. Returns for certain items were below profile 
for the first two quarters of the year, however all items are now registering 
positive growth. Even excise duties, which had been particularly impacted by 
cross-border motor trade, are now showing some minor increases. Figure 48 
illustrates the annual changes in taxation returns for the period January to 
 
                                                          
 
23  Linehan S., R. Lydon, T. McIndoe-Calder, P. Reddan and D. Smyth (2017). ‘The Labour Market and Wage Growth after 
a Crisis’, Quarterly Bulletin 04/October 17, Central Bank of Ireland. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
20
08
Q
3
20
09
Q
1
20
09
Q
3
20
10
Q
1
20
10
Q
3
20
11
Q
1
20
11
Q
3
20
12
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
20
13
Q
1
20
13
Q
3
20
14
Q
1
20
14
Q
3
20
15
Q
1
20
15
Q
3
20
16
Q
1
20
16
Q
3
20
17
Q
1
60 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 17   
October for the last four years for the main tax categories as well as the overall 
total amount. 
 
FIGURE 48 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%) FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY - AUGUST 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
While overall growth rates are slightly less than in previous years, the pace of 
increase is still significant and total receipts are set to meet expected levels for 
the current year.  
 
Another important indicator of the domestic economy is changes in pay related 
social insurance (PRSI), which typically tends to be quite highly correlated with 
developments in the Irish labour market. For the year to date, PRSI is showing an 
increase of 3.5 per cent. Taken with the expected increase in employment of 2.6 
per cent, this is an important indication of the performance of the Irish economy. 
  
The latest data on total gross voted Government current and capital expenditure 
suggest a slight underspend in both categories in the year to October as 
illustrated in Table 5. This suggests the Government is well on course to meet its 
total (current + capital) overall target for expenditure in 2017 of €58.9 billion. 
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TABLE 5 ACTUAL AND PROFILE GROSS GOVERNMENT CURRENT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (€ BILLION) 
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY - OCTOBER 
 Current Capital Total 
Actual 43.3 2.9 46.2 
Profile 43.5 3.1 46.6 
 
Sources:  QEC calculations and Department of Finance. 
 
Based on the improvement in taxation revenues during the course of the year and 
the performance on the expenditure side, we have revised our forecasts for the 
deficit for 2017 and 2018. We now expect a deficit of 0.3 per cent in 2017 and a 
mild surplus of 0.2 per cent in 2018. This contrasts with our expectation in the 
previous Commentary of a deficit of 0.6 and 0.2 per cent respectively.  
 
This improved fiscal outlook for 2018 is important given the significant increase in 
the fiscal space which is likely to be available to the Government for Budgets 
2019, 2020 and 2021 as can be seen in Table 6. This arises as the Government is 
on course to achieve its medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of a structural 
budget balance in 2018. Consequently the amount of net fiscal space available for 
Budget 2019 is likely to increase by 160 per cent vis-à-vis the amount in Budget 
2018. 
 
TABLE 6 GROSS AND NET FISCAL SPACE (€ BILLION) 2018 - 2021 
 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Gross Fiscal Space 1.7 3.6 3.8 3.8 
Net Fiscal Space 1.3 3.2 3.4 3.4 
 
Sources:  QEC calculations and Department of Finance. 
 
This represents a significant increase in the resources available to the Irish 
Government over the medium term. However, as noted in the previous 
Commentary, the challenge for policymakers over this period is to ensure that the 
Irish economy does not overheat and transitions to sustainable rates of growth. 
Consequently, fiscal policy will have to be conducted in a cautious and prudent 
manner. 
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FIGURE 49 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI* RATIOS (%) 
 
Sources:  QEC calculations. 
 
Figure 49 presents the debt-to-output ratio for both GDP and the new GNI* 
measure. As noted previously, while the trends are similar in both ratios, a 
significant difference exists in terms of the actual rate. The debt-to-GNI* ratio, for 
example is some 30 percentage points higher than the equivalent debt-to-GDP 
ratio, thereby giving a significantly different impression of the domestic 
economy’s ability to service its existing debt commitments. 
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General Assessment 
 
2017 is likely to see another strong year of growth by the Irish economy. Our 
assessment that output is likely to increase by 5 per cent this year will again see 
Ireland outperform all European and most OECD countries in that regard. In the 
main the consistently robust performance of the Irish economy is illustrated by 
two key economic indicators; taxation revenues and labour market performance 
continue to register substantial increases through the present year. One aspect of 
economic performance which is subdued is the traded sector of the economy. 
Both exports and imports registered much more muted levels of activity in 2017. 
While some of this is almost certainly related to difficulties associated with the 
National Accounts, in the long run a balanced growth path of both domestic and 
external sources of growth is optimal for an open economy such as Ireland’s.  
 
The decision by the ECB in October to reduce the scale of its bond buying 
programme to €30 billion per month from €60 billion in January 2018 reflects the 
improving macroeconomic conditions in the Euro Area. While Governor Draghi 
has acknowledged that inflation expectations are not yet back to 2 per cent per 
annum, underlying data in the Euro Area have been improving for some time. In a 
box in the International section, McQuinn and Whelan summarise recent work 
updating their earlier growth forecasts for the Euro Area. They sound a warning 
note concerning European growth prospects over the medium term by pointing 
out that the recent European growth performance can be characterised as a 
‘cyclical’ recovery and that long-standing concerns about the low rate of total 
factor productivity in the Euro Area persist. Indeed, even allowing for a return of 
investment and unemployment to pre-crisis levels, McQuinn and Whelan (2017) 
project growth in the Euro Area that is below 1 per cent per year over the next 
decade and weaker in later decades. Finally, McQuinn and Whelan (2017) 
reiterate their previous conclusion that, in the absence of a remarkable 
turnaround in European productivity growth, a return to higher rates of inward 
migration may be necessary if governments wish to keep the supply of labour 
growing and economic growth rates from falling. 
 
Given the improvement in the European economy the possibility of increases in 
future ECB policy rates arises. O’Toole, in a box in the Monetary and Financial 
section, outlines some of the issues which arise for the domestic economy as 
monetary policy is normalised. The implications are complicated in Ireland due to 
the current structure of the banking market. As O’Toole notes, most mortgage, 
consumer and corporate loans in Ireland have variable rates, thereby enabling 
Irish financial institutions to pass rate changes directly through to households and 
firms. However, the situation is complicated by the extent to which the monetary 
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policy transmission mechanism has been impaired in the Irish market, mainly due 
to difficulties originating in the international financial downturn. Therefore, it is 
difficult to predict the extent to which policy rate increases will be passed 
through to new lending rates as well as the rates on existing loans. However, as 
O’Toole points out, given the highly indebted position of Irish households and 
firms, it is likely ECB policy rate normalisation would have a more negative effect 
on the Irish economy than for most other European countries. This requires 
domestic policymakers to focus on reducing sovereign indebtedness, as well as 
increasing competition in the banking sector, which amongst other benefits to 
the economy, will help to moderate the impact of any policy rate rises. 
 
The overall recent budgetary package was limited somewhat by the available 
fiscal space. The previous Commentary argued that this was a prudent decision in 
light of the strength of current economic activity. The package of approximately 
€400 million in additional spending was in line with our recommendation for a 
neutral budget. In many respects, however, the real test for fiscal discipline will 
arise in the near future. Due to the rules governing the Stability and Growth Pact, 
the degree of fiscal space available to the Irish Government is set to increase 
significantly in the coming years. With the economy expected to continue to grow 
at robust rates, the Government will have to avoid the temptation to increase 
economic activity above that which is sustainable. In a Special Article to the 
Commentary, Callan et al. (2017) conduct the customary micro-level analysis of 
the distributionary impact of Budget 2018. Using the SWITCH methodology, 
Callan et al. (2017) establish that the overall impact of the budget policy will be to 
reduce incomes somewhat below the levels which would have obtained if tax and 
welfare parameters had been indexed in line with forecast wage inflation.  
 
One of the most important risks to the domestic economy is the performance of 
the UK. Concerns surrounding the state of the British economy continue to grow 
in light of the most recent economic data. While British labour market data are 
encouraging, ongoing uncertainty about Brexit is one of the main reasons for the 
decline observed in investment with activity in the housing market, in particular, 
cooling off in recent quarters. As noted in the International section of the 
Commentary, the recent changes in the net international investment position of 
the UK economy does appear to suggest a significant decline in investor 
confidence. The recent downward revision by the Office for Budget Responsibility 
(OBR), particularly for future UK productivity rates give rise to significant 
concerns about the longer-term growth prospects of the UK economy. While the 
Irish economy has diversified its export base substantially over the past 25 years, 
any marked decline in UK economic activity will almost certainly impact the 
domestic economy adversely. In addition, uncertainty about the future trade 
arrangements between the UK and the EU are likely to affect negatively the 
performance of indigenous firms in particular. 
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Given the strong Irish house price inflation over the past few years, McQuinn 
(2017), in a Special Article with this Commentary, assesses the sustainability of 
current Irish house prices and also evaluates the likely outcome for prices over 
the medium term. Overall the analysis suggests that Irish house prices are likely 
to increase over the next three to four years. This is due to a number of factors; 
current housing demand is underpinned by the strong performance of the Irish 
economy with developments in the labour market contributing to improvements 
in affordability. Also, the sluggish rate of supply response in the market is putting 
upward pressure on prices, while there is still some evidence that prices may 
have overcorrected post-2008. From a policy perspective, the conclusions suggest 
that the Government and relevant authorities should desist from any further 
measures which would stimulate housing demand. The Help to Buy scheme falls 
within this category. Additionally, from a fiscal perspective, it should also be 
noted that any reduction in taxation rates with the consequent increase in 
personal disposable income will also fuel demand in the housing market. This is a 
relevant consideration in terms of any future changes in personal taxation rates.  
 
The recent decision by the Central Bank of Ireland not to significantly change the 
macroprudential regulations is welcome. Any loosening of these measures at this 
point is likely to also fuel housing demand. As has been noted before and as 
McQuinn (2017) concludes the only policy change which distinguishes the present 
period of significant housing demand from the previous pre-2007 period is the 
presence of macroprudential regulations. The Central Bank must ensure, going 
forward, that substantial increases in mortgage credit supply do not themselves 
lead to increased house price inflation. Otherwise we face the real possibility of 
repeating the disastrous mistakes of the 2003-2007 era. 
 
The previous Commentary focused on the potential for overheating in the Irish 
economy. In that regard, another article in the present Commentary by Redmond 
and Whelan (2017) conducts particularly interesting micro-level analysis of the 
Irish labour market. They examine the nature of current employment in Ireland 
with respect to the intensity of use of certain skills and the mismatch between 
the skills possessed by employees and those required to do their jobs. The 
analysis reveals a high degree of skill underutilisation among Irish employees. The 
percentage of Irish workers reporting education or skill levels in excess of those 
required to do their job is the third highest of 28 EU countries. While there 
appears to be scope to better harness the skills of existing employees as the 
economy continues to improve and the labour market tightens, Redmond and 
Whelan (2017) also show that in terms of future sources of labour supply for 
Ireland’s growing economy, the overall numbers are still relatively small. 
Consequently, a key source of future labour supply for Ireland will be 
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immigration. However, as noted in Barrett et al. (2015),24 the implications of 
Brexit on migration flows between Ireland and the UK have yet to be established. 
 
The research by McQuinn (2017) and Redmond and Whelan (2017) both point to 
certain risks the Irish economy may experience in 2018 as it approaches full 
employment and its potential level of activity. This will require vigilance on a 
number of policy fronts: (1) macroprudential policy must ensure that 
unsustainable credit growth does not lead to emerging vulnerabilities in the 
domestic economy; and (2) fiscal policy must be employed cautiously as the 
degree of fiscal space available to the Irish Government is set to increase 
significantly over the coming years. 
 
 
                                                          
 
24  Barrett, A., A. Bergin, J. FitzGerald, D. Lambert, D. McCoy, E. Morgenroth, I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnicka (2015). 
Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland, Research Series 48, November 2015, ESRI. 
 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
  

 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 200.3 -3.1 0.9 194.1 -5.9 -4.0 182.6 4.0 1.5 190.0 
Tourism 4.3 8.4 7.4 4.7 5.0 4.0 4.9 3.0 3.0 5.1 
Other Services 122.0 11.7 10.7 136.3 30.0 14.0 177.1 11.2 8.0 197.0 
Exports Of Goods and Services 326.6 2.6 4.6 335.0 8.8 3.1 364.6 7.5 4.4 392.0 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     -0.0     -0.2     -0.2 
Adjusted Exports 326.6 2.6 4.6 335.0 10.0 3.1 364.4 7.5 4.4 391.8 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 4.4 17.5 13.3 5.2 56.9 48.5 8.2 10.4 20.8 9.0 
Other Building 7.8 31.1 23.3 10.3 16.0 11.0 11.9 26.6 20.0 15.1 
Transfer Costs 0.9 23.9 16.8 1.1 12.4 7 1.3 9.2 3.0 1.4 
Building and Construction 14.2 24.9 18.4 17.7 27.5 21.7 22.6 19.1 18.6 26.9 
Machinery and Equipment 39.0 79.4 76.7 70.0 17.5 14.5 82.2 14.1 10.2 93.8 
Total Investment 53.2 64.9 61.2 87.7 19.6 15.9 104.8 15.1 11.9 120.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc. 3.2 1.7 0.0 3.2 2.0 0.1 3.3 2.5 0.1 3.4 
Non-Agricultural Wages 76.1 5.4 4.1 80.3 5.8 4.6 84.9 5.4 4.6 89.5 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 20.9 26.3 5.5 26.4 51.2 13.5 39.9 24.3 9.7 49.6 
Total Income Received 100.2 9.6 9.7 109.9 16.6 18.2 128.1 11.2 14.4 142.5 
Current Transfers 23.9 -1.5 -0.4 23.6 0.5 0.1 23.7 -4.4 -1.0 22.7 
Gross Personal Income 124.2 7.5 9.3 133.4 13.7 18.3 151.8 8.8 13.4 165.1 
Direct Personal Taxes 28.2 4.1 1.2 29.4 4.7 1.4 30.8 3.4 1.1 31.8 
Personal Disposable Income 95.9 8.5 8.1 104.1 16.3 16.9 121.0 10.2 12.3 133.3 
Consumption 92.7 4.2 3.9 96.6 3.8 3.9 100.3 3.9 3.9 104.7 
Personal Savings 3.2 131.5 4.2 7.5 177.6 13.2 22.2 40.4 8.4 29.1 
Savings Ratio 3.4 
  
7.2   17.1   21.8 
Average Personal Tax Rate 22.7 
  
22.0   20.2   20.0 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 86.9 1.7 8.2 88.2 -1.5 -3.5 86.9 7.2 5.0 93.2 
Tourism 5.1 9.5 8.9 5.6 4.3 2.8 5.9 4.5 3.0 6.1 
Other Services 147.8 22.2 21.4 180.6 13.9 9.5 205.6 12.1 7.8 230.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 239.9 14.4 16.4 274.4 8.5 4.7 298.4 10.5 6.8 329.8 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0   -0.8   -0.8 
Adjusted Imports 239.9 14.4 16.4 274.4 8.5 4.7 297.6 10.5 6.8 329.0 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 326.6 335.0 364.6 392.0 
Imports of Goods and Services 239.9 274.4 298.4 329.8 
Net Factor Payments -51.9 -47.6 -51.0 -53.2 
Net Transfers -3.1 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 
Balance on Current Account 31.6 9.2 11.5 5.2 
As a % of GNP 15.4 4.1 4.6 2.0 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 109.9 112.8 108.6 108.3 
Industry 373.7 393.8 412.5 428.9 
Of which: Construction 125.5 135.8 147.9 160.4 
Services 1,473.9 1,506.6 1,548.6 1,580.9 
Total at Work 1,963.7 2,020.2 2,072.0 2,118.1 
Unemployed 203.3 172.9 136.9 120.6 
Labour Force 2,167.2 2,193.1 2,208.9 2,238.7 
Unemployment Rate, % 9.5 7.9 6.2 5.4 
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DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES: BUDGET 
2018 
 
Tim Callan, Maxime Bercholz, Karina Doorley, Claire Keane,  
Mark Regan, Michael Savage, John R. Walsh25 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the impact of the tax and welfare changes introduced in 
Budget 2018 on the distribution of income across households. The analysis uses 
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, which is based on data gathered by the CSO 
for almost 8,000 households in its nationally representative Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions for 2013 and 2014, calibrated to represent the 2018 population. 
The impact of policy is measured against a distributionally neutral benchmark – a 
budget which would index the money value of tax credits and welfare payment 
rates in line with expected growth in wages of about 3.1 per cent. 
 
Key findings include the fact that the overall impact of policy was to reduce 
incomes somewhat below the levels which would have obtained if tax and 
welfare parameters were simply indexed in line with wage growth. The average 
loss across all households is close to 0.4 per cent. At low income levels, these 
reductions, relative to a wage-indexed policy, were in the region of 0.6 per cent; 
at high income levels, the reductions were in the region of 0.2 per cent. 
 
Analysis at family unit level reveals losses of close to 0.4 per cent, compared to a 
neutral benchmark, for most family types. Losses are slightly lower (less than 0.2 
per cent) for single employees without children, and for double earner couples 
without children. Somewhat greater losses (0.6 per cent) are identified for retired 
couples, and a family type category which includes those who are outside the 
labour force – mainly in education, ill or disabled. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
25  We thank Gerry Reilly and the SILC team at the CSO for access to SILC data on which the SWITCH tax-benefit model is 
based. We thank anonymous referees for comments; any remaining errors or obscurities are the responsibility of the 
authors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this article we examine the distributional impact of the main tax and welfare 
measures in Budget 2018. Our analysis is based on SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit 
model,26 to ensure that we obtain a nationally representative picture. SWITCH is 
based on SILC (Survey of Income and Living Conditions), the CSO’s main survey of 
household income. The scale, depth and diversity of this survey allows it to 
provide an overall picture of the impact of the budget on Irish households, which 
cannot be gained from selected example cases. Data from 2013 and 2014 SILC are 
pooled, in order to increase the effective sample size to almost 8,000 households 
including 20,000 individuals.27 To ensure that these pooled data are nationally 
representative, weights are calibrated using information from demographic 
projections, the Revenue Commissioner’s Income Distribution Statistics, 
Department of Social Protection estimates of the number of recipients of a range 
of social welfare schemes, and a number of other sources to represent the 2018 
situation.28  
 
The areas covered by SWITCH, including income tax, PRSI, USC, property tax, 
welfare benefits and public service remuneration, account for the bulk of the 
impact of budgetary policy changes on households’ cash incomes in recent years. 
There are, however, some taxes (e.g. indirect taxes, which affect the purchasing 
power of cash incomes) which cannot at present be integrated fully within the 
modelling framework. Work on the inclusion of these taxes in the SWITCH model 
is now underway, based on the methods developed by Savage (2017), as part of a 
collaborative project with the Department of Finance. Like almost all tax-benefit 
models, the focus is on cash taxes and benefits; there is no standard 
methodology for the attribution of benefits from public spending to households.  
 
The results we obtain relate to the ‘cash’ or ‘first round’ effects of Budget 2018 
policy changes, before any adjustments in individual behaviour such as changes in 
employment status or hours of work. This is by far the most common approach 
internationally. A new strand in the SWITCH research programme has just begun, 
and will seek to identify the size and nature of labour supply responses to tax and 
welfare changes.29  
 
                                                          
 
26  See Callan et al. (2011) for a full description of the model. 
27  Due to the longitudinal component of SILC, some households are in both waves of the survey. Where a household is 
present in more than one of these waves, we use the most recent observation. For close to 70 per cent of households 
it is the 2014 data which are used; 2013 data are used only where a household is not re-interviewed. By design, SILC 
does not re-interview 25 per cent of households, and a further significant proportion cannot be contacted or refuse 
to respond. This structure means that the households in the pooled sample are not automatically representative of 
the 2014 population, but this issue is dealt with by the reweighting procedure described in the text, which ensures 
the SWITCH database is representative of the 2018 situation. 
28  A technical adjustment for sample size differences between years of SILC also applies. 
29  See Callan et al. (2009) for an implementation of this approach in the context of the reform of the tax treatment of 
couples. 
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MEASURING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF POLICY 
Analysis based on a large-scale nationally representative sample of households is 
essential in order to assess the overall impact of budgetary policy. Calculations 
for selected example households cannot give a representative picture of the 
impact of the budget for the population as a whole. The ESRI tax-benefit model 
(SWITCH) allows us to do this: it estimates the impact of direct tax and welfare 
changes using anonymised data from the CSO’s nationally representative Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions.  
 
The impact of policy change must be measured against an alternative specifying 
what would happen if the policy change did not take place (a ‘counterfactual’ 
policy). In the construction of budgets, the practice in Ireland has been to 
construct an ‘opening budget’ against which changes are measured. For tax and 
welfare, Ireland’s conventional opening budget simply freezes tax rates, credits 
and welfare payments at their existing levels, whereas the UK and the US have 
adopted differing forms of indexation with respect to prices and/or wages (see 
Callan et al., 2015, for more details). While the frozen benchmark is useful in 
accounting terms, it would be highly misleading in an analysis of distributional 
impact.30 With nominal wages, prices and real wages all showing positive growth, 
implementing the conventional opening budget would lead to real income losses 
for those dependent on welfare, while further up the income distribution 
incomes would rise (Callan et al., 2001; Bargain and Callan, 2010).31 Furthermore, 
using the opening budget as a basis to measure policy impact would mean that 
measured policy impact would depend on government’s definition of this default 
policy – something which varies across countries, and can change over time. 
 
The alternative used here is a policy which indexes both tax and welfare 
parameters with respect to the expected growth or decline in wages. This ensures 
that average tax rates are held constant (i.e. no fiscal drag), and leads to 
approximately equal growth (or decline) in income across different income 
groups (Callan et al., 2001). It should be clear that this is designed to provide a 
‘distributionally neutral’ benchmark, and is not intended as a policy 
recommendation. There are many reasons why it may be desirable to depart 
from this benchmark; but having a distributionally neutral benchmark, 
independent of the default position chosen by government, is essential in 
examining the distributional impact of policy changes. The wage-indexed 
benchmark is an established part of the standard toolkit for distributional 
analysis. 
 
                                                          
 
30  For a more detailed exposition, see Callan et al. (2001). 
31  When wages are falling, the conventional benchmark would give rise to income gains for welfare recipients and 
income losses for those in employment. 
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We use forecasts of wage growth to implement this approach. Results examining 
the impact of Budget 2018 are based on forecast wage growth of 3.1 per cent – 
an average of the forecast wage growth from the current Quarterly Economic 
Commentary (McQuinn et al., 2017, 3.0 per cent) and the Central Bank’s 
Quarterly Bulletin (Central Bank of Ireland, 2017, 3.2 per cent).  
 
Results shown are at the household level unless otherwise specified and are 
based on household disposable income (after taxes and benefits), adjusted for 
household size and composition, i.e. income per adult equivalent or ‘equivalised 
income’.32 
 
BUDGET 2018 
A wide range of taxation and welfare measures are directly included in our 
model-based analysis, including: 
• a €5 increase in the weekly rates of payment for pensioners aged 66 and 
over, with proportional increases for qualified adults and those on reduced 
rates; 
• a €5 increase in the weekly rates of payment for working age (under 66 years 
of age), with proportional increases for qualified adults, Jobseekers 
Allowance (JA) recipients who are under 26 years of age and other recipients 
on reduced rates; 
• a €2 increase in the weekly rates of payment for a qualified child; 
• a one-week increase in the duration of fuel allowance payments; 
• a €20 per week increase in the income disregard for the One Parent Family 
payment and the Jobseeker’s Transition payment; 
• a €100 increase in the Home Carer’s tax credit; 
• an increase of €750 in the standard rate income tax band for all earners; 
• a €200 increase in the earned income tax credit for the self-employed; 
• a €10 increase in the Working Family Payment thresholds (formerly Family 
Income Supplement) for those with up to three children; 
• a €2.50 increase in the Living Alone Allowance; 
 
                                                          
 
32  This adjusts income to take account of household size. The scale used is the scale used in official monitoring of 
poverty in Ireland, i.e. 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for subsequent adults and 0.33 for children aged 14 or under. 
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• reductions in USC; 
• a reduction in the value of mortgage interest relief to no more than 75 per 
cent of its 2017 levels; 
• the new phone allowance. 
 
Views may differ as to whether the 30-cent-per-hour increase in the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) should be included in the analysis.33 As this is paid for by 
employers, it can be argued that it should not be included on a par with tax and 
welfare adjustments. On the other hand, the minimum wage is a policy 
instrument with a distinct distributional profile, and its impact on the household 
income distribution may be of interest. We have undertaken the analysis both 
with and without the increase in the minimum wage. As differences between the 
‘with’ and ‘without’ results are barely perceptible we present simply the results 
with the minimum wage impact included.  
 
Overall, the SWITCH model provides good coverage of the main policy changes in 
Budget 2018. The SWITCH estimates of the full year cost of USC and income tax 
changes are some 10 per cent higher than the official estimates. As for welfare 
cash payments, the SWITCH estimates are close to 10 per cent lower than the 
expenditure estimates in the Budget – largely because some welfare payments go 
to persons outside the scope of household surveys, such as pensions going to 
those abroad or in nursing homes. 
 
We note two aspects of policy which are not included in the current analysis: the 
Housing Assistance Payment and the Affordable Childcare Subsidy scheme. 
Separate reports on both of these topics are in train. 
 
Figure 1 shows the impact of Budget 2018, relative to a neutral, wage-indexed 
budget, across ten equally sized income groups (deciles) ranked from the lowest 
to the highest incomes, after adjustment for household size.  
 
The first point to note is that there are losses across all income groups, averaging 
0.4 per cent overall, relative to a neutral, wage indexed budget. These losses arise 
because the adjustments to tax and welfare parameters were less than what full 
indexation (of 3.1 per cent) would imply. For example, the standard rate band 
 
                                                          
 
33  Some individuals in the sample have wages below the minimum wage. In our simulations, these cases are treated as 
if they had the minimum wage, and benefited from an increase. Alternative approaches to modelling the 10 cent per 
hour rise in the NMW also have very little overall impact on the outcomes measured here.. 
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was widened by €750, but indexation would have required an increase of €1,050. 
Similarly, the Budget raised welfare payments by €5 per week, while indexation 
would have required an increase of €6, or for pensioners, €7. It is these gaps 
between the changes required by indexation and the actual Budget changes 
which generate the losses observed in the chart. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, our estimates suggest that indexation of tax bands, credits and 
welfare payments would have cost in the region of €1,100 million. The resources 
used in Budget 2018 for personal taxes and welfare payments were some €400 
million lower than that figure, reflecting the particular squeeze on resources 
during this budgetary year. 
 
The pattern of losses across the income distribution is also illustrated in Figure 1. 
Somewhat greater losses were experienced in the bottom 40 per cent of the 
income distribution (losses of between 0.5 and 0.7 per cent). Losses for the top 
40 per cent of the income distribution were closer to 0.25 per cent. These 
changes are small compared to the losses imposed by austerity budgets and the 
gains from budgets during the boom years. For example, Budget 2006 involved 
gains of 1.8 per cent, averaged across households at all income levels, while 
Budgets 2009-2010 combined saw losses of over 5 per cent for the highest 
income quintile. 
 
FIGURE 1 IMPACT OF BUDGET 2018 – PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE 
INCOME BY INCOME DECILE RELATIVE TO WAGE-INDEXED BUDGET  
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, at December 2017 incorporating for 2018 the main 
changes in direct tax, welfare, and the National Minimum Wage. Each income group contains one-tenth of all 
households, ranked from lowest to highest incomes, adjusted (‘equivalised’) to take account of the numbers of 
adults and children in each household. Budgetary impacts are assessed relative to a neutral budget with tax 
bands, tax credits and welfare payments increased in line with expected wage growth of 3.1 per cent. 
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IMPACT BY FAMILY TYPE 
The preceding analyses have examined the impact of Budget 2018 across the 
income distribution. Here we examine how different family types have been 
affected by budgetary policy changes. The analysis is conducted at the level of 
what is termed a ‘tax unit’, i.e. an individual or couple, together with dependent 
children, if any. Young adults including third-level students are treated as 
independent tax units. 
 
Table 1 shows losses for all family types (ranked from the smallest to the largest 
percentage loss). For most types, the loss is between 0.3 and 0.5 per cent. Losses 
are slightly lower (less than 0.2 per cent) for single employees without children, 
which accounts for more than one in three of all families, and for double earner 
couples without children. Somewhat greater losses (0.6 to 0.7 per cent) are 
identified for single earner couples with children, retired couples, and a family 
type category which includes those who are outside the labour force – mainly in 
education, ill or disabled. Taken together, these groups account for just over one 
in four of all families. 
 
TABLE 1 IMPACT OF BUDGET 2018 – PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME BY 
FAMILY TYPE 
 
Budget 2018 
% Change 
Proportion Of Families 
% 
Single Employed without Children -0.1 36.5 
Dual Earner Couple without Children -0.2 4.3 
Single Earner Couple without Children -0.3 5.8 
Non-Earning Lone Parent  -0.3 1.3 
Single Retired Tax Unit -0.4 10.2 
Single Unemployed without Children -0.4 2.1 
Employed Lone Parent -0.5 5.3 
Dual Earner Couple with Children -0.5 7.4 
Unemployed Couple -0.5 0.5 
Retired Couple -0.6 9.1 
All Other Tax Units -0.6 9.3 
Single Earner Couple with Children -0.7 8.0 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, at December 2017 incorporating for 2018 the main 
Budget 2018 changes in direct tax, welfare, and the January 2018 increase in the National Minimum Wage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis provides a nationally representative picture of the impact of the 
main tax and welfare changes in Budget 2018, taking into account the increase in 
the National Minimum Wage. The analysis is undertaken relative to a 
distributionally neutral budget, implemented via indexation of tax and welfare 
parameters in line with expected wage growth.  
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Key findings include the fact that the overall impact of policy was to reduce 
incomes somewhat below the levels which would have obtained if tax and 
welfare parameters were simply indexed in line with wage growth. The average 
loss across all households is close to 0.4 per cent. At low income levels, these 
reductions, relative to a wage-indexed policy, were in the region of 0.6 per cent; 
at high income levels, the reductions, were in the region of 0.2 per cent. 
 
Analysis at family unit level shows that small losses are found for all family types. 
About one-third of families have losses close to the average loss of 0.4 per cent. 
Some four out of ten families – mainly single persons in employment – have 
losses of 0.1 to 0.2 per cent. Somewhat greater losses, of 0.6 to 0.7 per cent, are 
experienced by single earner couples with children, retired couples and a group 
including those who are not in the labour force (mainly students and those with a 
disability). 
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IRISH HOUSE PRICES: DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN? 
 
Kieran McQuinn 34  
ABSTRACT 
The pace at which Irish house prices have grown since 2013 has surprised many 
observers. The Irish housing market was one of the most affected across the 
OECD after the international financial downturn of 2007/2008, with prices falling 
by 54 per cent in nominal values between 2007 and 2013. However since 2013 
prices have increased by 50 per cent with recent house price inflation showing no 
signs of abating. The performance of the housing market currently very much 
reflects developments in the real economy with Ireland’s strong recovery in 
macroeconomic terms post-2013 resulting in falling unemployment and growing 
income levels, all set against the backdrop of persistently low Euro Area interest 
rates. In this paper, using a variety of approaches, recent developments in house 
prices are appraised; in particular, the sustainability or otherwise of current 
prices is evaluated and cross-country comparisons are also drawn. The unifying 
conclusion which emerges is that, given Ireland’s expected strong economic 
performance over the next five years, the domestic market, in the absence of a 
significant supply response, looks set to experience consistently rising house 
prices over the medium term. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most notable aspects of Irish economic resurgence post-2013 has 
been the rapid manner in which housing demand has recovered. Inevitably, in 
considering the Celtic Tiger era, general economic growth and the housing 
market became inextricably intertwined with highly adverse consequences for 
Irish social and economic life. The scale and impact of the post-2008 Irish 
downturn were profound; substantial levels of household debt had been incurred 
due to the increase in house prices, thousands of households experienced 
mortgage arrears and near irreparable damage was done to the entire Irish 
financial system. The economic and financial independence of the State was 
threatened by the systemic nature of the mortgage market crisis.  
 
 
                                                          
 
34  Thanks to Alan Barrett and Conor O’Toole, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), officials in the Department 
of Housing, Planning and Local Government and the Residential Tenancies Board for comments on an earlier draft. 
Any errors are the responsibility of the author. This research is funded by the Department of Housing, Planning and 
Local Government through its Programme for Housing Research with the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(ESRI).  
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Understanding the linkages between housing demand and key economic 
variables (often labelled ‘fundamentals’ in a housing context) is essential in 
evaluating the sustainability, or otherwise, of house price movements. This is 
particularly important in the context of a market experiencing significant price 
increases. In instances where house price growth does not appear to be justified 
by movements in underlying variables such as income levels, interest rates and 
demographics, then a ‘bubble’ or irrational exuberance is said to exist. A number 
of studies estimate that a bubble of approximately 30 to 40 per cent existed in 
the Irish property market by 2007 (McQuinn, 2014). When the global downturn 
occurred, the domestic mortgage market was particularly susceptible to its 
impact. As unemployment soared between 2008 and 2010 with a resulting 
contractionary impact on both affordability and market sentiment, Irish property 
prices went into free-fall with prices experiencing one of the largest corrections 
across the OECD. 
 
In this paper, following earlier studies, we evaluate the present level of house 
prices in the Irish market. To ensure that the analysis and consequently the policy 
implications drawn are not ‘model specific’, a variety of approaches are adopted; 
well established econometric models estimating fundamental prices, cross-
country comparisons of relative housing affordability and standard house price-
to-rent ratios are all examined to see whether the current level of house prices is 
warranted on the basis of market fundamentals. The results are unambiguous; 
the Irish market does not yet display any signs of overheating. By international 
comparisons, Irish prices would appear to be quite affordable. The results suggest 
that prices, barring some unexpected significant shock or a substantial increase in 
housing supply, are set to increase over the medium term.  
 
At present it would appear the Irish residential sector can be characterised as a 
market where prices have almost fully recovered from the substantial declines 
experienced between 2007 and 2013. However, the fundamental level to which 
prices normally tend to converge is itself increasing due to factors such as 
strengthening labour markets. Increased housing demand can also be observed in 
the significant increase in rents observed in the Irish market. Indeed, since 2007, 
the recovery in rents predated that of house prices.35 
 
The rapid recovery in housing demand contrasts sharply with developments on 
the supply side of the market. The Irish market was to the fore in international 
terms in simultaneously experiencing persistent increases in both supply and 
demand from the early 2000s to 2007. Housing supply averaged 84,000 units per 
 
                                                          
 
35  The Rental Tenancies Board Rent Index would suggest that rents started to increase on a consistent basis since 
Quarter 1, 2012. 
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annum between 2005 and 2007. However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
housing supply totalled just over 80,000 between 2010 and 2016. The collapse of 
the Irish construction sector post-2008 and related ongoing difficulties in the 
financial sector have all contributed to the present sluggish supply response in 
the Irish market and is consequently another contributing factor to house price 
inflation. It is estimated, for example, that annual long-run housing demand in 
the Irish mortgage market is approximately 30,000 to 35,000 units (see Duffy et 
al., 2016), whereas total supply in 2017 is forecast to be around 19,000 units.  
 
Most of the developments observed since 2013 in the domestic market have 
occurred in the absence of any significant increases in mortgage credit; indeed, 
one could argue that in terms of both the general economy and the housing 
market in particular, the recovery has been a ‘credit-less’ one. Coates et al. (2016) 
estimate that by 2014 up to 60 per cent of housing market transactions were 
accounted for by cash-only buyers. Since 2016 the provision of mortgage 
approval is increasing. While a normal, functioning credit market is essential for 
an economy generally, it does raise the possibility that credit growth in itself 
could start to become an engine of house price increases as it did in the Irish 
market post-2002/2003. This would result in prices growing at a greater pace 
than the underlying fundamental factors in the economy would suggest, 
inevitably resulting in overheating. As noted in McQuinn (2014), credit bubbles 
often emerge after periods of sustained improvements in fundamental factors in 
the economy. Therefore, policymakers must be particularly alert to this 
possibility. In that context, the presence of the macroprudential policy regime 
introduced by the Central Bank is the most efficient manner to prevent such a 
credit bubble emerging. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; in the next section we 
compare house prices and affordability in the Irish property market with 
developments across countries. A series of econometric models is then used to 
estimate a ‘fundamental house price’ with the associated results presented. A 
subsequent section focusses on the role that credit provision plays in influencing 
Irish house prices. A final section discusses the policy implications of the results 
and offers some concluding comments.  
 
A CROSS-COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE 
2.1  House price-to-income ratios  
Given the turbulent nature of house price movements in the Irish market in the 
recent past, it is useful to benchmark domestic developments within an 
international context. The greater availability of cross-country data on housing-
related issues enables useful and informative cross-country comparisons to be 
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drawn in terms of housing affordability. While residential markets can differ 
significantly in terms of traditional tenure preferences, planning and regulatory 
regimes and demographic profiles, it is useful to benchmark developments in key 
ratios such as house prices to disposable income. The International Monetary 
Fund, for example, regularly publishes such ratios in its evaluation of global house 
price trends.36 
 
Similar to McQuinn (2014) we examine trends using the international house price 
database maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,37 which compiles and 
maintains quarterly house price information for 22 advanced economies from 
1975 onwards. The database also contains information on household disposable 
income for the same period. 
 
TABLE 1 PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NOMINAL CROSS-COUNTRY HOUSE PRICES 1995 - 2017 
Country Q1 1995 - Q1 2007 Q2 2007 - Q1 2013 Q2 2013 - Q1 2017 
Australia 150 23 40 
Belgium 116 18 5 
Canada 93 21 40 
Switzerland 6 26 7 
Germany -4 11 19 
Denmark 193 -18 15 
Spain 199 -26 2 
Finland 153 15 -1 
France 145 3 -1 
UK 222 -8 28 
Ireland 474 -53 52 
Italy 84 -11 -8 
Japan -36 -15 -2 
South Korea 46 16 9 
Luxembourg 148 14 21 
The Netherlands 176 -15 14 
Norway 155 30 18 
New Zealand 159 6 43 
Sweden 145 16 37 
US 107 -17 21 
South Africa 427 23 27 
Croatia 121 -14 -1 
Israel 27 77 25 
 
Source: www.dallasfed.org/institute/houseprice. 
 
 
                                                          
 
36  See www.imf.org/external/research/housing/index.htm. 
37  For more information on this see www.dallasfed.org/institute/houseprice. 
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In Table 1 international house price growth across the period 1995 to 2017 is 
presented. The period is split into three periods; (i) 1995 to 2007, where house 
prices increased significantly across the OECD, (ii) 2007 to 2013, where house 
prices fell substantially across a number of countries and (iii) the recovery period 
2013 to the present. From the table, the significant performance of the Irish 
market is evident across all three sub-periods. Amongst all the countries, Ireland 
registered the largest increase in prices up to 2007; it subsequently experienced 
the largest decline post-2007 and has had the most robust recovery in the latest 
sub-period. 
 
Using data on disposable income from the same database, it is possible to create 
house price-to-income ratios (𝑃𝑡/𝐼𝑡).38 Both McQuinn (2014) and Grossman et al. 
(2013) have generated the same ratios to track trends in affordability across 
countries and time. 
 
FIGURE 1 RATIO OF HOUSE PRICES TO DISPOSABLE INCOME FOR A SELECT SUB-SAMPLE OF 
COUNTRIES Q1 2000 - Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
Figure 1 plots the ratio for a select sample of countries. From the graph, it is clear 
that the significant increase in Irish house prices up to 2007 caused the ratio of 
 
                                                          
 
38  The house price index used in the database is consistent with the US FHFA Quarterly Nationwide House Price Index 
for existing single-family houses (formerly called OFHEO house price index). Each house price index is seasonally-
adjusted and then rebased to 2005=100. The house price indexes are expressed in nominal terms, and also in real 
terms using the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator of the corresponding country with the same base 
year of 2005=100. The disposable income series is quoted in per capita terms using working age population of the 
corresponding country and similarly expressed in nominal and real terms (the latter with the PCE deflator). 
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price to income to increase sharply even at a time when Irish income levels were 
also rising quite strongly. However post-2008, the Irish ratio fell quite 
dramatically before stabilising around 2013 and increasing thereafter. However, 
even with the significant recovery in house prices post-2013, the data suggest 
that according to international standards, Irish house price-to-income 
affordability is currently quite low. For example the average ratio across the 22 
countries is just over 1 in 2017 compared with an Irish score of just over 0.7. It is 
worth noting that the index is based on the movement from a common base of 
100 in 2005. 
 
It is interesting to examine, given Irish disposable income levels, what a counter-
factual Irish house price would look like given an average house price-to-income 
ratio. Therefore, we generate an alternative Irish house price for the period 2000 
to the present. We take the average cross-country ratio of house prices to 
disposable income �𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑡
�
𝐴 plotted in Figure 1 and multiply it by the Irish index of 
disposable income: 
𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐶 = 𝐼𝐼𝑡 ×  �𝑃𝑡𝐼𝑡 �𝐴                                    (1) 
The resulting price is compared with actual Irish house prices in Figure 2 for the 
period in question. 
 
FIGURE 2 ACTUAL AND COUNTER-FACTUAL IRISH HOUSE PRICES: Q1 2000 - Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
As can be seen, up to 2006 the actual and counter-factual prices are closely 
aligned. After that, the actual price increases to a greater extent than the 
counter-factual; however when both prices start to fall in early 2008, the actual 
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price falls significantly more than the counter-factual. For example, the counter-
factual falls by a maximum of 16 per cent from its peak, whereas the actual price 
falls by 53 per cent. Both sets of prices start to rise from 2012/2013 onwards, 
however the counter-factual price in 2017 is now 9 per cent above its peak 2007 
level, whereas the actual price is still 28 per cent below its equivalent peak. 
 
What this suggests is that based on actual Irish disposable income and a cross-
country average of the relationship between disposable income and house prices, 
Irish house prices over the period 2000 to 2017 experienced overvaluation in the 
2006/2007 period and significant undervaluation in the post-2008 timeframe. It 
suggests the market is still somewhat undervalued in 2017. 
 
2.2  House price-to-rent ratios   
Another way of evaluating the sustainability of house prices is to use a more 
finance-based approach like the house price-to-rent ratio. In studies such as 
Gallin (2004) and Himmelberg et al. (2005) rents are assumed to reflect the long-
run equilibrium value of housing services. Consequently, movements in the house 
price-to-rent ratio can indicate whether the housing market is in equilibrium or 
not. In Figures 3 and 4 we plot aggregate rents for the Irish market and the price-
to-rent ratio over the period 1990 to 2017.39 
 
Reflecting the strong growth in the economy from the mid-1990s onwards, rent 
levels escalated consistently until 2007. Like house prices, rents declined 
significantly post-2008; however they appeared to reach their trough levels in 
mid-2010 almost three years before house prices did. Since 2011, rents have 
increased consistently.  
 
The corresponding house price-to-rent ratio (plotted in Figure 4) indicates a 
discrete change in the ratio from about 1997 onwards. The ratio reached a peak 
in 2007 before declining sharply afterwards until 2012. It has remained static for 
most of the period since then. While rents are rising significantly, reflecting the 
strong underlying performance of the economy, the fact that the ratio is both 
relatively stable and at 11.5, the lowest it has been since 1998, would again 
suggest that no bubble or overvaluation is apparent in the Irish property market 
at present. 
 
 
                                                          
 
39  Rental values are those reported by the Central Statistics Office (CSO).  
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Again, given the volatile nature of the Irish market it is informative to put this in 
an international context. In Figure 5, the current Irish ratio is compared with 
similar ratios for a select set of US cities for 2017. From the chart it is evident that 
the vast majority of the cities covered have ratios which are greater than that of 
the Irish market – of the 81 cities only three have ratios that are less than 11.  
 
Of course the house price-to-rent ratio may vary somewhat within the Irish 
market. For example the house price-to-rent ratio for Dublin may differ from the 
rest of the country. To that end in Figure 6, we present the house price-to-rent 
ratio for Dublin and the country as a whole. The underlying rental level used is 
now that estimated by the ESRI for the Rental Tenancies Board (see Lawless et al. 
(2017) for details).40 From the graph it is evident that while there is some 
difference in the levels between the different ratios, the trends are very similar.41 
While the ratio is clearly higher for the Dublin area, it is worth noting that the 
current level of just under 15 would still place Dublin at the lower end of the 
distribution in Figure 5. 
 
More generally, it is worth noting that equating house prices with rents is not 
above criticism in the literature. For example, Sinai and Souleles (2003) have 
noted that such an assumed relationship essentially ignores potential transaction 
costs and certain risks involved in both renting and owning a property. 
 
 
                                                          
 
40  The reason for using the different rental index is that unlike the rent index provided by the CSO, the ESRI/RTB index 
allows for a breakdown between Dublin and the rest of the country.  
41  The difference between the CSO and RTB index at the national level may be attributed to compositional issues. Also, 
the RTB index covers only new rental agreements.  
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FIGURE 3 AGGREGATE IRISH RENTAL LEVELS: Q1 1990 - Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
FIGURE 4 IRISH HOUSE PRICE-TO-RENT RATIO: Q1 1990 - Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
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FIGURE 5 HOUSE PRICE-TO-RENT RATIOS FOR IRELAND AND SELECT US CITIES, 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis and Smartasset; https://smartasset.com. 
 
FIGURE 6 HOUSE PRICE-TO-RENT RATIOS FOR DUBLIN AND IRELAND USING THE RTB AND CSO 
RENTAL INDICES Q3 2007 - Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
In this section we use a suite of econometric models to determine a fundamental 
Irish house price. This approach is particularly popular in the international house 
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price literature and has been used extensively in an Irish context over the past 20 
years to evaluate the performance of the market. Examples include Murphy 
(2005), Roche (2001; 2003), McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007), Kelly and McQuinn 
(2014) and McQuinn (2014). The attraction of the econometric approach is that, 
while finance based approaches assume a relatively narrow specification of house 
price determinants, econometric models enable house prices to be influenced by 
a broader set of variables. Furthermore, using a suite of models reduces the 
possibility that any policy conclusion derived on the basis of the results is ‘model-
specific’. 
 
Three different econometric specifications are used in this approach: 
1. House prices are assumed to be a function of demographics, disposable 
income and unemployment rates, 
This model is a variant of that specified and estimated in Kelly and 
McQuinn (2014). They discuss how unemployment, in particular, appears 
to be strongly related to movements in Irish house prices. 
 
2. House prices are assumed to be a function of affordability (a mortgage 
annuity combination of income and interest rates) and the ratio of the 
housing stock to population. This is a variant of the affordability model 
specified and estimated in McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007). The affordability 
model uses the following annuity formula where 𝐴𝑡 is defined as 
follows:42 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝜔𝑌𝑡 �1− (1+ 𝑅𝑡)−𝜏𝑅𝑡  �   (2) 
The annuity is the fraction of current disposable income (ωYt) that goes 
toward mortgage repayments and is discounted at the current mortgage 
interest rate (Rt) for a horizon equal to the term of the mortgage τ.43 The 
model assumes that the demand for housing is mainly a function of the 
amount that prospective house purchasers can borrow from financial 
institutions and this, in turn, is dependent on current disposable income 
and the existing mortgage interest rate. 
 
3. House prices are assumed to be a function of disposable income per 
capita, the user cost of capital and the housing stock per capita.44 
 
                                                          
 
42  This does assume that on average all housing transactions have some degree of mortgage credit.  
43  Details surrounding the assumptions in (2) are discussed in Technical Appendix 2 of the paper.  
44  In the estimation of the model we find the user cost of capital is not significant.  
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This is the standard inverted demand function which has been applied in 
the housing literature in applications such as Peek and Wilcox (1991), 
Muellbauer and Murphy (1994; 1997), Meen (1996; 2000), and Cameron 
et al. (2006). 
 
The models presented here are not an exhaustive list of those used in the 
literature. For example, hedonic price models, as outlined in Rosen (1974), 
employ regression techniques to control for various sources of heterogeneity in 
prices using observations on covariates and dummy variables that reflect implicit 
structural and locational prices. 
 
Details of the econometric estimation are presented in the Appendix.45 In Figure 
7 the fundamental house prices from the three models are compared with actual 
house prices, while in Figure 8 the deviation between each fundamental model 
and actual price is shown. 
 
FIGURE 7 ACTUAL AND FUNDAMENTAL REAL HOUSE PRICES Q1 2000 - Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
 
45  The RATS code along with the data used in all estimation is available, upon request, from the author.  
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FIGURE 8 PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND FUNDAMENTAL PRICES  
Q1 2000 – Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
The results show that while the fundamental prices can differ somewhat from 
each other over the period, at present the results are broadly similar. Namely, 
while fundamental and actual prices have converged significantly over the past 
few years, actual prices are still very much explained by key economic and 
demographic factors in the Irish economy. Indeed, technically there is still some 
undervaluation in the Irish market, however this is now less than 10 per cent. In 
McQuinn (2014), which estimated fundamental prices up to the end of 2013, the 
degree of undervaluation was somewhere in the region of 12 to 20 per cent.  
 
Overall, the results of the econometric models suggest, along with the earlier 
analysis, that house prices are still explained by fundamental factors within the 
Irish economy. While the absence, currently, of a bubble in house prices is 
somewhat reassuring, it is worth noting that house prices can vary significantly 
due to changes in fundamental variables. Nonetheless, the expected robust 
performance of the Irish economy generally over the next couple of years is likely 
to result in continued upward pressure on prices. 
 
3.1  Future Irish house prices: an affordability scenario  
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implications of future trends in affordability, the housing stock and population 
levels on house prices. The forecast house price model is in error correction 
format. Using the error-correction format allows for any deviation between 
actual house prices and the long-run level to impact on the manner in which 
house prices evolve into the future. So, for example, if house prices are currently 
below their long-run level, this would, ceteris paribus, cause future house prices 
to increase. Using an error correction model in such a way is very common in the 
literature and has been applied in an Irish case in Kelly and McQuinn (2014) and 
McQuinn (2014). The full details of the model are summarised in Technical 
Appendix 2 of the paper.  
 
To generate forecasts, future values for 2017 to 2020 are required for the capital 
stock, population levels, interest rates and disposable income. Following the 
latest Quarterly Economic Commentary (QEC) forecasts (McQuinn and O’Toole, 
2017), housing supply is assumed to increase to 18,500 in 2017 and 23,400 in 
2018. For 2019 and 2020, housing supply is assumed to increase to 29,700 and 
36,700 respectively. Population growth is assumed to increase by the same rate 
as the historical average over the period 2012-2016.46 Disposable income is also 
assumed to increase in line with the most recent QEC forecasts as is the personal 
consumption deflator.47  
 
Recently, there has been some commentary about the possibility of future 
interest rate increases across the Euro Area (see Claeys and Efstathiou (2017) for 
example). To illustrate the impact of changes in interest rates on prices, two 
interest rate paths are assumed for the forecasting exercise. One scenario leaves 
interest rates constant over the forecast period, while a second scenario assumes 
a gradual tightening of future monetary policy with mortgage interest rates 
increasing as a result. The two paths are presented in Figure 9. 
 
 
                                                          
 
46  This is approximately 0.009882 per cent per annum.  
47  In nominal terms disposable income is assumed to grow by 7.2 per cent, 5 per cent, 4 per cent and 4 per cent for 
2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 respectively.  
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FIGURE 9 HISTORICAL AND FUTURE ASSUMED MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES (%): Q1 2000  
– Q4 2020 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
The second scenario assumes that by the end of 2020, mortgage interest rates 
will have increased to 3.75 per cent from 2.56 per cent at present.  
 
The corresponding real house price forecasts are presented in Figure 10. 
 
FIGURE 10 HISTORICAL AND FUTURE FORECAST REAL IRISH HOUSE PRICES (INDEX): Q1 2000  
– Q4 2020 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
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From the graph it is evident that under both scenarios, Irish house prices are 
expected to increase over the next four years. In real terms, under Scenario 1, 
prices are forecast to grow by 20 per cent over the period, while under the higher 
interest rate path, the model indicates that prices will increase by 14 per cent.48 
 
CREDIT AND THE IRISH HOUSING MARKET 
The scenario above assumes that prices will grow in line with changes in 
fundamental variables in the economy. Underpinning this is the assumption that 
there is some steady-state relationship between credit provision and these 
fundamental variables. However, as evidenced by developments in the Irish 
residential market, changes in mortgage credit can also have a key impact on 
house prices. A number of studies, such as Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007), 
Addison-Smyth et al. (2009) and McCarthy and McQuinn (2017), have examined 
the role that changes in credit conditions played in Irish house price inflation up 
to 2007. As a result, it is important to assess the implications that credit 
conditions can have for future Irish house prices. 
 
To relax the assumption about a steady-state level of credit provision, we 
augment the standard inverted house price equation used in the previous section 
(Model 3) to include an indicator of credit supply in the Irish mortgage market. 
The model, which was originally specified and estimated in Duca et al. (2011), has 
also been estimated in an Irish context by Kelly and McQuinn (2014). The 
indicator is created by taking the observed aggregate loan-to-value ratio and 
‘filtering’ out demand-side factors. By this we mean the observed loan-to-value is 
regressed on a series of demand-side variables such as income levels and the 
unemployment rate. The ‘adjusted’ loan-to-value variable is then the observed 
ratio with the demand-side components subtracted or netted off and represents 
an indicator of changes purely in credit supply conditions. 
 
When the indicator is added to the house price equation we get a coefficient 
estimate of 0.42 (see Table A5 in the Appendix for details). As the equation is in 
log-log form, this coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity, i.e. a 1 per cent 
increase in the credit supply indicator results in house prices increasing by over 
0.4 per cent. While changes in the supply of residential mortgage credit have 
been negative through most of the recovery, positive growth rates have been in 
evidence since the mid-point of 2016 (see Figure 11). Any significant increase in 
credit will have an additional impact on house price growth above and beyond 
that of economic fundamentals. 
 
 
                                                          
 
48  As a further sensitivity analysis, we hold the housing supply level fixed over the period 2017-2020 at 18,500 units per 
annum. This results in house prices being 0.5 per cent higher at the end of the period than under the baseline case.  
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FIGURE 11 ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (%) IN CREDIT FOR HOUSE PURCHASING: Q4 2011 – Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
Recent work has also sought to provide an alternative indicator of mortgage 
credit provision in an international context (McQuinn, 2017). The basic idea 
behind this approach is to provide time-varying estimates of the relationship 
between the affordability variable (𝐴𝑡) and house prices in Model 2 estimated 
earlier. The standard model is  
𝑝𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑎𝑡    (3) 
 
where 𝑝𝑡 is the log of real house prices and 𝑎𝑡 is the log of the annuity formula in 
Equation (2). In the original application 𝛽 is fixed or does not vary through time. 
In the subsequent McQuinn (2017) application 𝛽 is now allowed to time vary. As 
this is again a log-log equation the coefficient on the affordability variable may be 
considered the elasticity of house prices with respect to affordability. By allowing 
the coefficient to change over time, this is recognising that the elasticity of house 
prices with respect to affordability will vary through time, mainly as a result of 
changing credit conditions. The elasticity can vary due to changing loan-to-value 
and debt-to-income ratios in the market. In Figure 12, the changing elasticity in 
an Irish context is presented. 
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FIGURE 12 ELASTICITY OF HOUSE PRICES WITH RESPECT TO AFFORDABILITY: Q1 2000 – Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
The clear increase in the elasticity in the period up to 2008 is evident; changing 
credit conditions enabled Irish households to secure larger mortgages for given 
income levels and interest rates. Thereafter, the elasticity declined sharply as 
credit conditions contracted due to the implications of the financial crisis. What 
this demonstrates is that over a relatively short period of time, changing credit 
conditions – by increasing this elasticity – can have significant implications for 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
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strong growth envisaged in the Irish economy over this period and the continued 
likely accommodative nature of Euro Area monetary policy. Both of these 
developments will fuel increased levels of affordability amongst prospective 
homeowners, in turn leading to greater demand. 
 
Given the strong price growth envisaged, any Government policy applied to the 
Irish market clearly needs to focus on increasing housing supply. Unfortunately, 
as noted in a cross-country assessment of housing supply policies (Morley et al., 
2015), there are relatively few options available. The recent Budgetary 
announcement concerning the introduction of the proposed site tax is a welcome 
development. Certainly, given the expected strong growth of prices, the 
Government should avoid any policies which would further increase housing 
demand. 
 
One issue which will require ongoing, critical assessment is likely future 
developments in the provision of credit. Much of the persistent increases in 
house prices observed since 2013 have occurred in the absence of any credit 
growth. Consequently, as the Irish banking sector slowly heals itself and 
economic growth continues, credit conditions are likely to become more 
expansive over the medium term. The danger is that similar to the 2003-2007 
period, credit growth, itself, will fuel greater house price inflation. In that regard 
the new macroprudential policy framework adopted by the Irish Central Bank will 
be hugely important. As suggested in Duffy and McQuinn (2014), an integral 
component of this framework should be an evaluation of house prices vis-à-vis 
fundamental levels and an assessment of the growth of the stock of mortgage 
credit. Based on the analysis conducted here, any future changes in 
macroprudential policy should not serve to increase affordability, i.e. by easing 
loan-to-value or loan-to-income restrictions. Furthermore, over the medium 
term, if any imminent overvaluation is detected in the housing market, 
macroprudential policy should act in a counter-cyclical manner and actively seek 
to restrict housing demand due to the extent that is fuelled by credit growth and 
hence price growth. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 1 
TABLE A1  LOG OF REAL HOUSE PRICES – MODEL 1 
Variable Coefficient T-Stat P-Value 
Log (Population) 0.835 5.58 0.00 
Log (disposable income per capita) 0.642 9.91 0.00 
Log (unemployment rate) -0.376 -21.22 0.00 
𝑹𝟐���� 0.97 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note:  Model estimated over the period: 1981:1 – 2017:1. 
 
TABLE A2  LOG OF REAL HOUSE PRICES – MODEL 2 
Variable Coefficient T-Stat P-Value 
Log (Affordability) 0.756 7.021 0.00 
Log (Capital stock per capita) -1.003 -1.907 0.0584 
𝑹𝟐���� 0.77 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note:  Model estimated over the period: Q1 1980 – Q1 2017. 
 
TABLE A3 LOG OF REAL HOUSE PRICES – MODEL 3 
Variable Coefficient T-Stat P-Value 
Log (disposable income per capita) 2.539 14.816 0.00 
Log (Capital stock per capita) -2.704 -7.428 0.00 
User Cost of Capital 0.002 0.491 0.624 
𝑹𝟐���� 0.91 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note:  Model estimated over the period: Q1 1981 – Q1 2017. 
 
TABLE A4 CHANGE IN THE LOG OF REAL HOUSE PRICES – ERROR CORRECTION FORECAST MODEL 
Variable Coefficient T-Stat P-Value 
Error Correction Term (t-1) -0.046 -4.181 0.00 
Change in the log of House Prices (t-3) 0.300 4.133 0.00 
Change in the log of House Prices (t-4) 0.374 5.165 0.000 
Change in the log of Affordability 0.121 2.209 0.029 
𝑹𝟐���� 0.38 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note:  Model estimated over the period: Q2 1981 – Q1 2017. 
 
TABLE A5 LOG OF REAL HOUSE PRICES – MODEL 3 AUGMENTED TO INCLUDE CREDIT SUPPLY 
Variable Coefficient T-Stat P-Value 
Log (disposable income per capita) 2.549 14.920 0.00 
Log (Capital stock per capita) -2.917 -7.726 0.00 
User Cost of Capital 0.0001 0.127 0.898 
Log (Adjusted LTV) 0.417 1.849 0.066 
𝑹𝟐���� 0.91 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note:  Model estimated over the period: Q1 1981 – Q1 2017.  
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 2 
In this appendix, the error correction model used to generate the house price 
forecasts in Section 3.1 is described. The model can formally be summarised as 
follows: 
∆𝑝𝑡 = �𝑝𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽𝑡−1 𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑡−2  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡−1 � + �∆𝑝𝑡−𝑘4
𝑘=1
 
+� ∆𝑎𝑡−𝑗4
𝑗=0
 + � ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡−𝑗
4
𝑗=0
                 (A1) 
where p refers to the log of real house prices, 𝐶𝐴𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑃
 is the log of the ratio of capital 
stock to population. For the short-run variables we specify a four-quarter lag 
length, given that the data are quarterly. 𝑎𝑡 is the log of 𝐴𝑡 the annuity formula 
used in McQuinn and O’Reilly (2008) and defined as equation (2) in the text:49 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝜔𝑌𝑡 �1− (1+ 𝑅𝑡)−𝜏𝑅𝑡  �       (A.2) 
For the parameters, we assume a 25-year structure for the term while we assume 
28 per cent of income (𝜔) goes on the mortgage repayment. Both of these 
assumptions follow from the in depth analysis of Irish loan-level data in McCarthy 
and McQuinn (2017). The interest rate used is obtained by weighting the 
mortgage interest rates on loans for less than one year, between one and five 
years and for over five years by the corresponding volume of loans as published 
by Central Bank of Ireland.50 
 
The results of the model are presented in Table A4. The Hendry (1995) ‘general to 
specific’ approach is adopted in that variables which are not significant at the 5 
per cent level are dropped from the final model. This results in three short-run 
variables remaining; the change in house prices at lag length 3 and 4 and the 
contemporaneous change in affordability. All three variables have positive 
coefficients denoting that any increases in these variables will put upward 
pressure on house price inflation. The error correction term itself is 4.6 per cent; 
this indicates that where there is a deviation between the actual and long-run 
house price, 4.6 per cent of this gap is corrected for each quarter. This equates to 
an annual error correction term of almost 20 per cent, which is common in the 
literature. The t-statistic on the error correction term is also significant indicating 
that the specification of an error correction model is warranted. 
 
 
                                                          
 
49  This does assume that on average all housing transactions have some degree of mortgage credit.  
50  www.centralbank.ie/statistics/data-and-analysis/credit-and-banking-statistics/retail-interest-rates. 
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EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SKILL UTILISATION IN THE IRISH 
LABOUR MARKET: AN EU COMPARISON 
 
Paul Redmond and Adele Whelan51 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years the Irish economy has experienced strong economic growth 
accompanied by significant improvements in the labour market. The 
unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2017 stands at 6.2 per cent (CSO, 
2017), its lowest rate in nine years. In light of these improvements in the labour 
market, we examine the nature of current employment in Ireland with respect to 
the intensity of use of certain skills and the mismatch between the skills 
possessed by employees and those required to do their jobs. Furthermore, we 
consider the possible future sources of skilled labour supply by examining the 
characteristics of those currently unemployed and inactive in the labour market, 
as well as the ability of Ireland to attract high-skilled migrant workers. Our 
analysis reveals a high degree of skill underutilisation among Irish employees. The 
percentage of Irish workers reporting education or skill levels in excess of those 
required to do their job is the third highest of 28 EU countries. Our findings also 
indicate that, as was the case in recent decades, immigration may play an 
important role as a source of skilled labour in a tightening labour market.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The unemployment rate in Ireland, as of Quarter 2, 2017, was 6.2 per cent (CSO, 
2017), its lowest rate in nine years. As the economy improves and the labour 
market tightens, the issues facing the Irish economy today are likely to be very 
different from those which arose during the Great Recession, when the 
unemployment rate peaked at 15 per cent in 2011 and 2012. In this context, we 
examine the nature of current employment in Ireland with respect to the 
intensity of use of certain skills, as well as the mismatch between the skills 
possessed by employees and those required to do their jobs. In doing so, we 
draw comparisons between Ireland and the other 27 EU Member States by 
utilising the 2014 European Skills and Jobs Survey (ESJS). 52 We also consider the 
possible future sources of skilled labour supply in a tightening labour market, by 
 
                                                          
 
51  We thank anonymous referees for comments; any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.  
52  Cedefop’s ESJS is the first survey on skill mismatch carried out across all EU28 Member States (Cedefop, 2014). It 
examines the drivers of skill development and the evolution of skill mismatch in relation to the changing complexity 
of the skills and tasks required for individual’s jobs. Related documents can be accessed at: 
www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-projects/projects/european-skills-and-jobs-esj-survey. 
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examining the characteristics of the unemployed and inactive workers in Ireland 
as well as the ability of Ireland to attract high-skilled migrant workers.  
 
Skills mismatch is a broad term which incorporates a number of different 
concepts (McGuinness et al., 2017a). Vertical mismatch refers to a misalignment 
between the skills or education levels possessed by employees and those 
required to do their job. A large body of literature examines the consequences of 
overskilling and overeducation, describing scenarios whereby employees possess 
skills or education levels which exceed those required to do their job.53 
Therefore, overskilling and overeducation represent an underutilisation of 
existing skills.  
 
It is important to point out that when discussing high rates of overeducation or 
overskilling, the policy implications are not about reducing education levels 
within a country, but rather on how to better utilise the existing skills of the 
labour force. Indeed, while individuals whose education is not fully utilised suffer 
a wage penalty relative to individuals with the same level of education in 
matched employment (see, e.g., McGuinness and Sloane, 2011), they earn a 
wage premium relative to their lower educated counterparts doing the same type 
of job (see e.g. Lindley, 2009). As such, there are positive wage returns associated 
with acquiring additional years of education, even for those individuals whose 
skills and education are underutilised.  
 
In this paper, we also examine underskilling and undereducation, which refer to 
scenarios whereby employees possess skills and education levels which fall below 
those required to do their job. We also discuss the concept of skill shortages, 
which refers to unfilled or hard-to-fill vacancies due to a lack of suitably qualified 
or skilled candidates. 
 
While policy recommendations, such as the country specific recommendations 
from the European Commission, often focus on skill shortages54 (European 
Commission, 2017a), our analysis indicates that a relatively large proportion of 
Irish employees report skill underutilisation in their current jobs. Moreover, the 
Manpower Talent Shortage Survey 2015 suggests that skill shortages in Ireland 
are not as prevalent as in other developed economies, with the incidence of hard-
to-fill vacancies due to a lack of suitably skilled candidates being the lowest out of 
42 countries. Nonetheless, even if they are not prevalent at an aggregate level, 
 
                                                          
 
53  For a review, see McGuinness et al. (2017a). 
54  The European Commission (2017b) refer specifically  to the National Skills Bulletin 2016 (EGSFN, 2016) highlighting 
skill shortages in the areas of ICT, engineering, sales, logistics, health, business and finance.  
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skill shortages may arise in certain specific occupations or sectors, thereby posing 
challenges for employers trying to fill specific types of jobs. 
 
In terms of potential sources of skilled labour, we show that those currently 
experiencing unemployment have higher education levels than the inactive. In 
addition, despite a high number of people classified as ‘inactive’, only a very small 
percentage of these are shown to have a strong enough attachment to the labour 
market to be considered as a potential source of labour supply. Therefore, the 
scale and composition of those currently experiencing unemployment, when 
compared to the inactive, show greater potential in this regard. However, the 
overall numbers of potentially high-skilled employees, when considering both the 
unemployed and the inactive, are relatively small. Given this, and the potential 
continued growth in labour demand, immigration may play an important role. 
The ESJS data reveal that the share of foreign-born workers with tertiary 
education in Ireland is the third highest in the EU, at 57 per cent. As such, the 
high education level of immigrant workers in Ireland as well as a relatively highly 
educated pool of unemployed individuals suggests that Ireland appears well 
positioned to fill high-skilled jobs as they arise.  
 
2. THE CURRENT LABOUR MARKET 
In this section we use recent labour market data from the 2017 Quarterly 
National Household Survey (QNHS) to give an overview of the current position of 
the Irish labour market. Table 1 outlines some of the main labour market and 
employment related statistics for the Irish economy. The unemployment rate has 
been declining for the last number of years. The current rate of 6.2 per cent 
represents a dramatic improvement compared to the rate of 15 per cent 
recorded during the economic crisis in 2011 and 2012. The labour force 
participation rate in Ireland declined with the onset of the Great Recession in 
2008, however it has been stable in recent years and currently stands at 59.8 per 
cent. The percentage of employees working part-time is 22.2 per cent, down 
from 23.8 per cent in Quarter 1, 2016, and the percentage of employees on 
temporary contracts is 7.5 per cent, compared to 7.8 per cent in Quarter 1, 2016. 
Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics relating to educational attainment. 
Taking the adult population as a whole, those aged 25-64, Ireland has a highly 
educated population with 44 per cent educated to tertiary level and 37 per cent 
educated to upper secondary or post-secondary level. The percentage of 
individuals educated to tertiary level in Ireland is above the OECD average of 35 
per cent.55  
 
 
                                                          
 
55  See OECD, 2016. Available at: www.education.ie/en/Publications/Statistics/International-Statistical-
Reports/Education-at-a-Glance-OECD-Indicators-2016-Briefing-Note.pdf. 
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TABLE 1 LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS (QUARTER 2, 2017) 
 % 
Unemployment rate (15-74 years) 6.2 
Labour force participation rate (15+ years) 59.9 
Temporary employees 7.5 
Part-time employees 22.2 
Highest education level (aged 25-64 years)  
    Lower secondary or below 18.9 
    Upper secondary or post-secondary (non-tertiary) 36.7 
    Tertiary (short cycle / bachelor / master / doctoral) 44.4 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.  
Notes:  The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is reported. Temporary and part-time employees are expressed as a percentage of 
all employees. The education levels relate to all individuals (unemployed, employed and inactive) aged 25-64 years. 
 
3. SKILL INTENSITY AND SKILLS MISMATCH 
We examine the skill content of jobs in Ireland using the 2014 Cedefop European 
Skills and Jobs Survey (ESJS), which captures information on employees’ skill 
levels and skill utilisation for 28 EU Member States. The survey contains the 
following question, ‘Which of the following best describes the highest level of 
literacy skills required for doing your job?’, with four possible responses; 1. Basic, 
2. Advanced, 3. Not Applicable / Literacy Skills Not Required and 4. Don’t Know. 
There are similar questions relating to numeracy and ICT skills. Figures 1-3 report 
the percentage of full-time employees who state that their jobs require advanced 
skills in the 28 EU Member States.56 In terms of literacy skills (Figure 1) 57 per 
cent of Irish full-time employees state that their jobs require advanced literary 
skills. This is above the EU average of 50 per cent and ranks Ireland fifth highest 
out of 28 countries, behind Austria, Italy, Germany and Luxembourg. A similar 
pattern emerges when we look at numeracy skills (Figure 2), with 39 per cent of 
full-time employees in Ireland stating that their job requires advanced numeracy 
skills, the fifth highest of 28 countries. However, just 17 per cent of Irish 
employees report that their job requires advanced ICT skills (Figure 3), putting 
Ireland below the EU average, ranking 13th highest out of 28 countries. Figure 4 
shows the proportion of jobs that are highly skill intensive across all three areas, 
numeracy, literacy and ICT. Just over 10 per cent of employees in Ireland rate 
their job as highly skill intensive across all three measures, which is the tenth 
highest of 28 countries.  
 
                                                          
 
56  A variable is created which equals one if employees state their job requires advanced skills and zero if employees 
state that basic skills are required or that the question is not applicable / skills not required.  
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FIGURE 1 EMPLOYEES REPORTING THAT THEIR JOB REQUIRES ADVANCED LITERACY SKILLS (%)57 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
 
FIGURE 2 EMPLOYEES REPORTING THAT THEIR JOB REQUIRES ADVANCED NUMERACY SKILLS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
 
                                                          
 
57  The EU28 refers to the following countries: Belgium [BE], Bulgaria [BG], Czech Republic [CZ], Denmark [DK], Germany 
[DE], Estonia [EE], Ireland [IE], Greece [GR], Spain [ES], France [FR], Croatia [HR], Italy [IT], Cyprus [CY], Latvia [LV], 
Lithuania [LT], Luxembourg [LU], Hungary [HU], Malta [MT], Netherlands [NL], Austria [AT], Poland [PL], Portugal [PT], 
Romania [RO], Slovenia [SI], Slovakia [SK], Finland [FI], Sweden [SE], and United Kingdom [UK].  
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 FIGURE 3  EMPLOYEES REPORTING THAT THEIR JOB REQUIRES ADVANCED ICT SKILLS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
 
FIGURE 4 EMPLOYEES REPORTING THAT THEIR JOB REQUIRES ADVANCED NUMERACY, 
LITERACY AND ICT SKILLS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
 
It is important to note that that the definition of ‘advanced skills’ is subjective and 
may vary across countries. For example, what employees in one country consider 
to be advanced skills may be considered basic in another country. Nonetheless, 
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specific benchmark. For example, it could be the case that what employees in 
Ireland consider advanced ICT skills are of a higher level than other countries. 
Therefore, when answering the question, employees in each country are applying 
their own benchmark as to what they consider to be advanced skills. The fact that 
just 17 per cent of Irish employees consider their jobs to require advanced ICT 
skills may point to skills underutilisation, whereby employees find their ICT 
related work tasks to be relatively easy.  
 
We can further investigate the issue of skill underutilisation using a separate 
question in the ESJS which asks employees, ‘Overall, how would you best describe 
your skills in relation to what is required to do your job?’, with employees 
responding that their skills are either; 1. Higher, 2. Matched or 3. Lower than 
what is required to do their job. Figure 5 shows the percentage of employees 
who report that their skills are underutilised in their job across all 28 countries. A 
relatively high percentage of Irish employees consider themselves to be 
overskilled. At 46 per cent, this is the fourth highest rate of skill underutilisation 
out of 28 EU countries, behind Greece, Austria and the United Kingdom.  
 
The literature highlights a number of costs to the individual associated with skills 
underutilisation. These individuals are found to suffer a wage penalty relative to 
individuals with similar skill levels in matched employment (see, e.g., McGuinness 
and Sloane, 2011; Sánchez-Sánchez and McGuinness, 2015; Sloane, 2014). 
Similarly, as discussed in the introduction, individuals whose education is not fully 
utilised suffer a wage penalty relative to individuals with the same level of 
education in matched employment, (see, e.g., McGuinness and Sloane, 2011). 
However, these types of workers earn a wage premium relative to their lower 
educated counterparts doing the same type of job (see, e.g., Lindley, 2009). 
Therefore, the wage returns to each additional year of education, while lower 
than those for matched employees, are still positive for individuals who find 
themselves in jobs whereby their education and skills are not fully utilised.  
 
There is also evidence that individuals who are mismatched have lower levels of 
job satisfaction (Mavromaras et al., 2012; Sloane, 2014; Green and Zhu, 2010; 
Congregado et al., 2016). Higher incidences of skills underutilisation in an 
organisation is also associated with lower workplace harmony (Belfield, 2010). In 
addition, mismatched workers are also more likely to want to quit their job 
(McGuinness and Wooden, 2009) and experience lower skills development 
(Cedefop, 2015a). Regarding the persistence of mismatch, the evidence is mixed. 
Verhaest et al. (2015) and Clark et al. (2014) find that overeducation can be quite 
persistent. Specifically, Clark et al. (2014) show that 66 per cent of overeducated 
US workers remained overeducated after one year. However, Frei and Sousa-
Poza (2012) find that spells of overeducation in Switzerland are typically short. 
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Overskilled workers with a higher academic degree tend to have the highest 
persistence of mismatch, while workers with vocational education are found to 
exit mismatch more quickly (Mavromaras and McGuinness, 2012).  
 
A study by McGuinness et al. (2017b) finds Ireland to have a relatively high level 
of overeducation compared to the rest of the EU. They use EU-LFS data to 
compile a panel dataset of overeducation in Europe. Unlike the subjective 
approach of measuring overeducation or overskilling, whereby employees are 
asked directly to compare their education or skill level to their job requirements 
(as in the ESJS data), they use a statistical measure of overeducation. This 
involves calculating the modal level of education for each two-digit ISCO 
occupation code and categorising workers as over (under) educated if their level 
of education is above (below) the modal education level for their occupation. 
McGuinness et al. (2017b) find that over the period 2001 to 2011, the rate of 
overeducation in Ireland, at 33 per cent, far exceeded the EU average of 19 per 
cent. 
 
FIGURE 5  EMPLOYEES REPORTING THAT THEY ARE OVERSKILLED FOR THEIR JOB (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
 
The percentage of full-time workers in Ireland who consider themselves to be 
underskilled, as measured using the ESJS survey, is approximately 8 per cent. 
While this is considerably lower than the rate of overskilling, it is still relatively 
high in comparison to other countries, with Ireland having the seventh highest 
rate of underskilling out of 28 EU Member States (Figure 6). Therefore, given 
Ireland’s relatively high rates of skills mismatch, in terms of both overskilling and 
underskilling, it is not surprising that Ireland ranks quite poorly in relation to the 
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percentage of employees who consider their skills to be matched to their job. The 
percentage of matched employees in Ireland is 46 per cent, the fourth lowest 
rate in the EU28, with only Greece, Austria and the UK recording lower rates of 
matched employment (Figure 7). 
 
FIGURE 6  EMPLOYEES REPORTING THAT THEY ARE UNDERSKILLED FOR THEIR JOB (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
 
FIGURE 7  EMPLOYEES REPORTING THAT THEY ARE MATCHED FOR THEIR JOB (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
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4. THE POLICY DEBATE ON SKILLS MISMATCH  
The area of skills mismatch attracts a great deal of attention among policymakers. 
However, as noted by McGuinness et al. (2017a), the policy advice surrounding 
skills mismatch can sometimes be vague. As mentioned, skills mismatch is a very 
broad concept and can incorporate a number of different types of mismatch, 
including vertical mismatch (usually measured in terms of overeducation, 
undereducation, overskilling and underskilling), skill gaps, skill shortages (usually 
measured in terms of unfilled and hard-to-fill vacancies), field of study 
(horizontal) mismatch and skill obsolescence. It is important that policymakers 
are cognisant of this fact and avoid using the term skills mismatch without 
specifically stating the type of mismatch in question. For example, while the 
European Commission’s 2016 and 2017 country specific recommendations (CSRs) 
for Ireland raise the issue of skills mismatch as a potential policy concern, a 
greater discussion of the precise types of mismatch would be informative.58  
 
The policy debate on mismatch often addresses areas of mismatch for which 
there is the least available evidence, namely skill shortages. The term skill 
shortage describes a situation whereby employers are unable to fill vacant posts 
due to a lack of qualified candidates. The evidence on skill shortages is usually 
based on employer surveys such as the European Business Survey (EBS), the 
Manpower Talent Shortage Survey and the European Company Survey (ECS). As 
highlighted by McGuinness et al. (2017a), caution is called for when using these 
types of employer surveys to inform the policy discussion on skill shortages. This 
is due to difficulties in disentangling genuine skill shortages, which arise when 
demand for skills by employers cannot be met by supply at market clearing wage 
rates, from other types of recruitment difficulties relating to issues such as poor 
wages, working conditions, or inadequate recruitment and human resource 
functions within the firm. The percentage of employers facing genuine skill 
shortages may fall well below the percentage of employers reporting recruiting 
difficulties (Cedefop, 2015b). Nevertheless, we can look to some of these 
employer surveys as a guide to assessing the degree of skill shortages across 
countries. In particular, the 2015 Manpower Talent Shortage Survey asks 
employers how much difficulty they have filling jobs due to a lack of available 
talent, while also ranking the types of jobs for which skill shortages are most 
apparent. It is notable that Ireland is singled out as the country with the lowest 
level of difficulty (out of 42 countries) filling jobs.  
 
5. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF FUTURE LABOUR SUPPLY 
In this section we use data from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) 
to examine the potential sources of future labour supply for the growing Irish 
 
                                                          
 
58  The 2017 CSR documents can be accessed at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2017-european-semester-
country-specific-recommendations-commission-recommendations_en. 
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economy. We focus specifically on the composition of three groups; migrant 
workers, the inactive, and the unemployed. Furthermore, we utilise the EU 
Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey 
(ESJS) to compare Ireland’s position relative to the other EU Member States.  
5.1 Migrant workers 
After the expansion of the EU in 2004 with the entry of ten new Member States, 
there was a sharp increase in the flow of migrants to Ireland (Barrett et al., 2011). 
Ireland was one of only three countries, including Sweden and the UK, that 
allowed full access to its labour market for the citizens of the new Member 
States. This, coupled with strong economic growth in Ireland at that time, 
resulted in large numbers migrating to Ireland. In 2002, immigrants accounted for 
just 5 per cent of Irish employees. However, by 2007, this had increased to 10 per 
cent (Barrett et al., 2011). This increased further in subsequent years, with non-
Irish nationals currently accounting for 18 per cent of all employees.59 The ESJS 
data allow us to compare the percentage of foreign-born employees in Ireland 
with the EU28.60 As we can see from Figure 8, Ireland has the third highest 
percentage of foreign-born employees in the EU. 
 
As noted by González Pandiella (2016), Ireland is very open to international 
migration flows, with immigration helping to provide the skills required by the 
Irish economy. The ESJS data reveal that the share of foreign-born workers with 
tertiary education in Ireland is the third highest in the EU, at 57 per cent (Figure 
9). In 2016, a breakdown of immigration by educational attainment for recently 
arrived immigrants highlighted that more than half (57.1 per cent) of the 
migrants aged 15 and over had a third-level degree or above (CSO, 2016). These 
findings highlight the importance of high-skilled migrant workers to the Irish 
labour force and show that Ireland has a proven capability in attracting highly 
educated workers. However, the evidence shows that migrants face both a pay 
gap and an occupational gap, suggesting their skills are not being fully utilised 
within the Irish labour market (Barrett et al., 2012; Barrett et al., 2016). The ESJS 
data confirm this by showing that foreign-born workers in Ireland report the 
second highest level of overskilling in the EU, at approximately 50 per cent. 
Therefore, while migration represents an important source of skilled labour 
supply, there is scope for better utilising the skills of migrant workers.  
 
 
                                                          
 
59  The European Migration Network, using data from the Quarterly National Household Survey, publish statistics 
relating to Non-Irish nationals. See http://emn.ie/index.jsp?p=128&n=138. 
60  There is a question in the ESJS data which asks the employee whether they were born in the country in which they 
are currently working.  
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FIGURE 8  PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN-BORN EMPLOYEES, 2014 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014.  
 
FIGURE 9  SHARE OF MIGRANTS IN EMPLOYMENT WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION, 2014 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Cedefop European Skills and Jobs Survey, 2014. 
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5.2 Inactive  
Next we focus on labour force participation rates and the composition of those 
currently classified as ‘inactive’ in the labour market as another potential source 
of labour supply. In terms of participation rates, female participation increased 
substantially in the decade before the economic crisis and, following a decline at 
the onset of the crisis in 2008, has since stabilised. This can be seen in Figure 10 
which shows participation rates for males and females aged 15-74 years. While 
the female participation rate in Ireland is below the EU average, the male 
participation rate is slightly higher and, consequently, the overall participation 
rate for Ireland is quite similar to the EU average, at approximately 65 per cent. 
Bercholz and Fitzgerald (2016) find that the economic crisis had a particularly 
significant impact on women under 30, who remained in education in their 20s 
for a longer period than before the crisis. Bercholz and Fitzgerald (2016) suggest 
that the educational attainment among women aged 30 and over will continue to 
increase in Ireland for at least a decade, with a corresponding increase in female 
labour force participation among this cohort. They predict that as older women 
retire and are replaced with younger women with more education, this may have 
a positive productivity effect on the economy. 
 
FIGURE 10  PARTICIPATION RATES, 2001 -2016 (%) 
 
 
Source:  EU Labour Force Survey. 
Notes:  Expressed as a percentage of the population aged 15-74.  
 
Table 2 shows the composition of the inactive as predominately female (59 per 
cent), over 45 years of age (56 per cent) with lower secondary or less education 
(51 per cent). In the second quarter of 2017, those classified as ‘not in the labour 
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force’ totalled 1,477,000 individuals. Some of these individuals have a stronger 
attachment to the labour force than others and are classified by Eurostat as 
potential additional labour force (PALF). This group includes ‘persons seeking 
work but not immediately available’ and ‘persons available for work but not 
seeking’. Of the 1,477,000 individuals who are ‘not in the labour force’ in Ireland, 
33,900 are classified as potential additional labour force (CSO, 2017). Therefore, 
despite the large number of individuals currently classified as ‘inactive’, the 
potential implications for labour supply appear relatively weak given their 
composition and the small proportion classified as being in the potential 
additional labour force. There is also the additional difficulty and complexity 
associated with attempting to design policies that impact on labour force 
participation rates and reduce inactivity. Very little is known in this regard, 
especially when compared to the greater body of research relating to policies 
aimed at reducing unemployment. 
 
TABLE 2  COMPOSITION OF THE INACTIVE (QUARTER 2, 2017)  
 % 
By Age  
    15-19 20.3 
    20-24 7.3 
    25-34 7.4 
    35-44 9.6 
    45-54 10.5 
    55-64 16.0 
    64-74 29.0 
By Gender  
    Male  41.2 
    Female 58.8 
By Education Level  
    Lower Secondary (& below)  50.7 
    Upper Secondary  24.1 
    Post Secondary 8.4 
    Tertiary 16.8 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey, Q2, 2017. 
 
5.3 Unemployed 
The steady pace of employment creation and the corresponding reduction in 
unemployment since 2012 can be seen in Figure 11, with the unemployment rate 
now fast approaching the pre-crisis level. In 2017, most sectors of the economy 
are experiencing employment growth, with the construction sector and the 
information and communications sector registering the largest recent increases. 
We examine the composition of those currently classified as unemployed in the 
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labour market to further examine their potential as an additional source of future 
labour supply. 
 
FIGURE 11  UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, 1998 – 2017 (%) 
 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Notes:  Expressed as a percentage of the population aged 15-74. 
 
In the second quarter of 2017, the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate for 
Ireland reached 6.2 per cent, compared to the Euro Area seasonally-adjusted 
unemployment rate of 9.1 per cent.61 The lowest unemployment rates in August 
2017 were in the Czech Republic (2.9 per cent), Germany (3.6 per cent) and Malta 
(4.2 per cent), with the highest unemployment rates in Greece (21.2 per cent) 
and Spain (17.1 per cent). From August 2016 to August 2017, the absolute 
magnitude of the decrease in the unemployment rate in Ireland was among the 
largest in Europe, declining by 1.6 percentage points (from 7.9 to 6.3 per cent). 
Other countries which experienced large declines were Spain (2.2 percentage 
points), Croatia (2.1 percentage points), Cyprus (2.4 percentage points) and 
Slovakia (2.1 percentage points). The seasonally-adjusted youth unemployment 
rate for Ireland was 12.7 per cent in August 2017, a significant drop compared to 
a rate of 17.2 per cent recorded in August 2016. The most recent figures for the 
EU28 in August 2017 show the seasonally-adjusted youth unemployment rate 
was 16.7 per cent with the lowest rate observed in Germany (6.4 per cent) and 
the highest rates in Greece (43.3 per cent), Spain (38.7 per cent) and Italy 
(35.1 per cent). While the scale of the problems confronting the Greek, Spanish 
and Italian labour markets and economies is clearly evident, Ireland’s 
 
                                                          
 
61  Please see Eurostat, 2017. Available at:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics. 
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performance is improving significantly and is now more closely aligned with the 
EU average.  
 
The composition of the unemployed is shown in Table 3. The unemployed are 
found to be predominately male (62 per cent) and, compared to the inactive, 
unemployed individuals are younger in age (particularly the short-term 
unemployed) and have relatively high levels of education; 24.9 per cent of 
unemployed individuals have tertiary education compared to 16.8 per cent of the 
inactive. In the second quarter of 2017, the seasonally-adjusted number of 
persons unemployed was 141,500 and this was the first quarter since Q3 2010 
that long-term unemployment (one year or more) accounted for less than 50 per 
cent of total unemployment. In terms of the ability of activation programmes to 
reintegrate the unemployed into the labour market, recommendations have been 
made for strengthening policy in this area (McGuinness et al., 2014; Martin, 2014; 
Kelly et al., 2015). 
 
TABLE 3  COMPOSITION OF THE UNEMPLOYED (QUARTER 2, 2017)  
 All (%) Short-Term Unemployed (%) 
Long-Term 
Unemployed(%) 
By Age    
 15-19 9.3 14.1  
 20-24 16.2 20.1 14.962 
 25-34 23.5 24.2 23.0 
 35-44 20.2 19.6 21.8 
 45-54 17.7 12.0 23.3 
 55-74 13.2 10.1 17.0 
By Gender    
 Male  62.4 54.5 69.3 
 Female 37.6 45.5 30.7 
By Education Level    
 Lower Secondary (& below)  28.2 21.8 33.4 
 Upper Secondary 32.7 34.5 30.1 
 Post Secondary 14.2 12.0 17.2 
 Tertiary 24.9 31.8 19.3 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey, Q2, 2017. 
Note:  The 65-74 age category is omitted because of the small sample size 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The self-reported skill intensity of jobs among Irish employees is relatively high in 
terms of literacy and numeracy, but lower in terms of ICT skills. Just over 10 per 
 
                                                          
 
62  The figure of 14.9 per cent refers to ages 15-24. Two age categories, 15-19 and 20-24, are combined due to small 
sample sizes.  
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cent of employees in Ireland rate their job as highly skill intensive across all three 
measures. Ireland is also shown to have a relatively high degree of skill 
underutilisation, as measured by the rates of both overeducation and 
overskilling, with Ireland recording some of the highest rates of skill 
underutilisation in Europe.  
 
Despite the high rates of skill underutilisation and a vast body of literature 
documenting the negative consequences associated with this type of skills 
mismatch, the policy debate in Ireland and across Europe typically focuses on the 
area of skill shortages. There is a concern, especially in a tightening labour 
market, that skill shortages may pose significant problems. However, as reported 
by the 2015 Manpower Talent Shortage Survey, the incidence of hard-to-fill 
vacancies due to a lack of suitably skilled candidates reported by Irish employers 
is the lowest out of 42 countries. Therefore, while skill shortages may be 
problematic in certain specific sectors, it appears that a more prevalent issue 
relates to the fact a large number of Irish employees are not fully utilising their 
skills and education in their current employment. While over 45 per cent of full-
time employees in Ireland say that their skills are in excess of what is required to 
do their job, just 8 per cent say their skills are inadequate for their job.  
 
While there appears to be scope to better harness the skills of existing employees 
as the economy continues to improve and the labour market tightens, another 
consideration relates to the additional sources of labour supply in the future. Our 
findings suggest the level and composition of those currently experiencing 
unemployment, when compared to the inactive, show greater potential for 
providing future sources of labour supply for Ireland’s growing economy. 
However, it is unlikely that this group alone can fully meet the increased labour 
demands. As such, a key source of future labour supply for Ireland may be 
immigration. This has been an important source of labour supply in Ireland in 
recent decades. In 2002, immigrants accounted for just 5 per cent of employees 
in Ireland. However, by 2016 this figure had increased to 18 per cent. Moreover, 
a large proportion of immigrants are highly skilled. The ESJS data show that the 
share of foreign-born workers with tertiary education in Ireland is the third 
highest in the EU, at 57 per cent. 
 
Finally, while not the focus of this study, it is important to highlight the 
uncertainties surrounding Brexit and its potential impact on the Irish labour 
market. Garcia Rodriguez (2017), building on previous work by Bergin et al. 
(2017), estimates that a ‘hard Brexit’ will lead to higher unemployment in Ireland. 
Furthermore, while strong migration links exist between Ireland and the UK 
(Barrett et al., 2015), the implications of Brexit on migration flows to Ireland have 
yet to be established.  
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